Report of the Executive Secretary to the Eighteenth Session of the Commission by unknown
REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 
TO THE EIGHTEENTH SESSION 
OF THE COMMISSION 
(La Paz, Bolivia, 18-26 April 1979) 





I. THE 19 70s: CULMINATION OF A CYCLE, INTERRUPTION 
AND ADVANCE TOWARDS THE UNKNOWN 4 
A. The slowdown of the 1970s 4 
B. The pressures of the conjuncture: new faces 
for old problems 8 
C. The external factor conditioning the immediate 
prospects: the evolution of the central 
economies 10 
II. THE GREAT CHALLENGES OF THE COMING DECADE 17 
A. The first challenge and requirement: broadening 
the social impact of growth 20 
1. The size of the social challenges 22 
2. Mission: possible'. . 2 7 
3. Stages of a redistribution strategy ........ 29 
(a) The critical poverty approach 30 
(b) The basic needs approach 31 
(c) The integrated change approach ......... 32 
B. The second challenge and requirement: to 
accelerate the economic growth rate 31 
1. The economic growth imperative 34 
2. Possibility of growth: the region's 
potential 35 
(a) The natural resource base 3P 
(p) The new labour force 39 
(o) Capital goods production potential ..... 4 2 
(d) Size of the market '+5 
3. Four requirements for a growth strategy .... 4 7 
(a) Increase in domestic savings 4& 
(b) The growth of exports 48 
(c) Rural development and the growth 
of agricultural prodaction 50 
(d) Need to secure a minimum of stability 
in price levels 52 
/C. The 
- IV -
C. The third challenge and requirement: 
strengthening the autonomy of growth 54 
1. The new forms of Latin America's 
insertion into the international 
sphere 56 
2. Lessening external vulnerability: 
the tasks of the region 57 
3. Reduction of external vulnerability: 
areas in which the co-operation of the 
international community is required 60 
(a) A new international framework in 
the field of basic commodities 61 
(b) External financing 6 2 
(c) Relations with the transnational 
corporations 65 
(d) Control of the new protectionism 
in the industrial centres 66 
4. A basic requirement: the restructuring 
of the central countries' economy 69 
5. The strengthening of Latin America's 
bargaining capacity 70 
III. FINAL REFLECTIONS 75 
INTRODUCTION 
» ** . • 
Once again I have the honour and the privilege of addressing 
this plenary to submit for the consideration of the member 
governments of CEPAL the report of the Executive Secretariat to 
the eighteenth session of the Commission, here in the hospitable 
city of La Paz. 
As on other occasions, I should like to take this opportunity 
t» express s«me thoughts on the economic and social situation of 
the region, in the light of our observation of the many diverse 
facets of Latin American reálity. 
This meeting is taking place at a special moment in our 
history, as one decade draws to a close and another dawns. These 
moments of transition have a particular attraction in the historical 
evolution of our societies, for they are suitable occasions for 
exercises of introspection which enable us, as we look at the 
recent past, to put forward some hypotheses concerning the major 
problems and challenges which will face us in the 1980s, An 
exercise of this kind is particularly timely and necessary at a 
moment when the governments of the region must turn to the task of 
laying the fo-ip.dations of what is to be the international developmen' 
strategy for the forthcoming decade, to be discussed by the United 
Nations General Assembly in 1980. 
This kind of analysis, however, is inherently fraught wi'cn. 
difficulties, for obvious reasons. In the first place, we are 
living today under the sign of change and uncertainty in all 
spheres. This is clearly visible in the international economic 
situation and the violent changes in the political, economic and 
social settings which affect the very values on which we believed 
that post-war civilization was firmly based. These changes 
traseend the confines of the economy, and call into question in 
various ways man's present and continued existence on this planet. 
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Furthermore, the growing interdependence among the nations 
of the globe - another sign of our times - means that no-one can 
escape the effects of these changes, and our region has certainly 
felt their impact especially strongly. One thing is sure, namely 
that following a period of extraordinary prosperity and confidence 
in a stable future, which began some thirty years ago, we have 
entered a dangerous period in which feelings of insecurity and 
anxiety about the future prevail at every level. 
It is therefore a hazardous business to venture on 
hypotheses about the probable course of future events. All 
forecasts which go beyond the short term may become quite 
unrealistic very shortly after being formulated. 
It is equally difficult to formulate hypotheses about, the 
future of Latin America, again for a number of reasons. Perhaps 
the most important of these is the course followed by the world 
economy, which has such a direct effect on the development of the 
countries of the region. Equally important are the great changes 
which have taken place in Latin America in recent years. New 
political situations, new economic experiences and new social 
factors have emerged, revealing profound changes which in many 
respects are often in keeping with those which have occurred at 
the world level. 
This has meant that the common traits of the region have 
been overlaid by increasingly clear and unmitigated disparities 
between some of our countries, stemming partly from their 
varying geographic and demographic size, their different economic 
and social structures, or the particular way in which they are 
linked with the world economy. This explains why, despite the 
common denominators, it is more difficult now that previously to 
generalize about the problems of the region. Always risky, such 
generalizations have now become more dangerous than ever. 
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Despite these obstacles, however, reflexion about the 
immediate past and possible future scenarios for the region as a 
whole is particularly necessary and opportune. The speed with 
which events are taking place in the modern world often obliges 
us to give priority to immediate problems. Thus, by force of 
circumstance, there is a growing tendency at all levels to focus 
on the short term, a tendency which should be overcome from time 
to time, however, in order to drav/ on the wealth of regional 
experience for guidelines to orient future action. 
This, indeed, has been the role of CEPAL over its many years 
of existence. We therefore feel bound, on occasions such as this, 
to express our thoughts to the governments of the region - in all 
honesty, and fully aware of the limitations of the undertaking -
in order to let them know our views on the fundamental problems 
of the day and the great challenges of the approaching decade. 
It is in this spirit that I wish to make a number of 
comm.ents on three major areas of concern: 
- Firstly, the main lessons to be learned from the economic 
and social evolution of the 1970s; 
- Secondly, the balance-sheet of the achievements and 
shortcomings of the process of change observed in the region in 
recent decades; 
- And, finally, what we consider to be the main challenges 
of the near future. 
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I. THE 1970s: CULMINATION OF A CYCLE, INTERRUPTION 
AND ADVANCE TOWARDS THE UNKNOWN 
A. The slow-down of the 1970s 
Anyone looking at the main features of the world economic 
situation in the 1970s must conclude that the decade will be 
remembered for two fundamental aspects: the culmination of a 
cycle of unprecedented progress which began in the 1950s, and 
the profound change of direction in this trend which occurred 
in the middle of the 1970s. 
If, looking back, the period between 1970 and 1973/1974 
represented the euphoric culmination of the post-war cycle of 
expansions the succeeding years saw the interruption of that 
process and the beginning of a stage of substantial adjustments 
which are still continuing, and whose complexity, intensity and 
duration make it impossible to discern as yet the nature of the 
new stage which may take shape after this interregnum. 
Some tend to view the 197 3 rise in oil prices as the decisive 
element in this uneven evolution. However, it is important not 
to exaggerate its importance, or to ignore other significant 
factors, for in reality this rise in prices was superimposed, in 
the central economies, on a variety of monetary and financial 
upheavals which date from the final years of the previous decade, 
and which emerged clearly in 1971. At that time the embryonic 
symptoms of "stagflation" had already been diagnosed, and deep 
thought was being given to the possible consequences of the 
policies designed to remedy it by decreasing growth rates.1/ 
Thus the "oil trauma" should be regarded more as the spark 
which precipitated and aggravated a worsening situation than as 
the sole or basic cause of it. 
1/ See, for example, CEPAL, Economic Survey of Latin America, 197 
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The fact is that, for a complex set of reasons, significant 
break took place in a trend of progress and economic growth 
which had begun two and a half decades previously and which had 
begun to seem indefinite. 
If the problem is viewed from the standpoint of our region, 
a similar evolution can be identified in the economic field: the 
culmination of a dynamic cycle of growth in the product at the 
beginning of the decade, followed by a decline in the expansionary 
cycle in the second half of the period. 
The first essential element in the decline in the region's 
former buoyant trend was, of course, the performance of the 
central economies. The document presented to the CEGAN meeting 
by CEPAL records with startling clarity how growth in the region 
has followed the ups and downs in the central countries, and 
particularly the downward tendency starting'in 197H and 1975 
(see figure 1). 
Notwithstanding slight differences in trajectory, intensity 
and performance in specific cases - to which I shall refer below 
this parallelism confirms the long-standing conception of the 
reflex character of the cyclical movements on the periphery - a 
fact which we must not forget in our current discussions on 
interdependence. 
At the same time, one can also see with clarity the impact 
of the realignment of international prices, and particularly the 
rise in the price of petroleum. The latter has had very different 
effects depending on the country in question: so much so that it 
has necessitated a systematic differentiation between countries 
which export fuels and the remaining non-fuel-exporting 
countries - the majority - which have had to face up to different 
degrees of dependence on
6 -
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It is worth while emphasizing that the serious problems of 
the latter have not led to conflicts or animosity vis-à-vis the 
former, the fundamental reason being that the affected countries 
have, not forgotten two very important aspects of the matter. 
Firstly 3 undoubtedly no primary commodity - in this case 
non-renewable - had suffered such a damaging deterioration in its 
price in the post-war period. In fact, as is demonstrated in a 
recent CEPAL publication, the real price of petroleum dropped by 
almost half between 1950/1951 and 1973, before it was readjusted.!/ 
This process might well be regarded as a clear demonstration of 
the historical short-sightedness of the traditional policy on raw 
materials and its consequences. In that context the following 
statement by the President of the European Economic Communityj 
Mr. Roy Jenkins, is telling: 
"For far too lon^ the industrialised world assumed that it 
had a divine right to indefinite supplies of cheap energy. 
We seem to be learning-from our mistakes ., 
although the learning process is still too slow.''2_/ 
Secondly, aside from possible reservations concerning the 
form of the price readjustment and the use made of the increased 
revenue, the affected countries could not but appreciate the 
potential implications of joint action in favour of an adequate 
return for their commodity exports. 
Finally, it is also clear that the upsets of the recent 
period are linked with the very characteristics of national forms 
of development and the policies adopted to deal with them. Despite 
the favourable climate for expansion which prevailed until -1973/1974 
in Latin America, one cannot forget that even then many countries 
were encountering serious difficulties and uncertainty concerning 
the continuation of the process of transformations in production 
1/ See J.W. Mullen, World oil prices: prospects and implications 
for energy policy-makers an Latin American oil-defxcit 
countries. Cuadernos de la CEPAL, Santiago, 1978. 
y Europe and the Developing World, speech delivered to the 
Overseas Development Institute in London on 8 March 1979. 
and the form of that process, especially as regards its social 
impact. Although it had specific features in each country, the 
phenomenon was repeated both in the larger economies and in the 
medium-sized and smaller economies. 
In this way the particular problems posed by the 
international economic situation were added to the specific 
problems of each country and were either exacerbated or alleviated 
depending on the countries' degree of vulnerability and the 
capacity of national policies to deal with them. 
B. The pressures of the conjuncture; 
new faces for old problems 
The upheaval of the middle of the decade took place against 
this background, and economic policies had to add to the 
traditional challenges the more pressing problems arising from 
the international economic situation. 
Firstly, the countries most affected by the situation were 
obliged to tackle simultaneously problems on their external 
accounts, the repercussions of inflation and their depressive 
consequences for production activity, employment and income 
distribution. The policies differed according to the countries, 
but all of them had to take dramatic steps, combining and 
re-ordering their defensive policies in very different ways. The 
three-way choice between growth rates, external borrowing and the 
degree of inflation was as frequent as it was painful, and old 
problems reappeared which the region thought it had overcome in 
the euphoria of the beginning of the decade. 
Secondly, the countries which benefited from a rise in their 
foreign currency earnings had to cope with the task of 
assimilating the additional resources t« ensure maximum impact on 
development and minimum effect on inflation. Their position was 
more favourable than that of the former, but it undoubtedly put 
the tools of economic policy to the test. 
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It would be mistaken to liken this crisis of the niid-1970s 
to previous crises, for two reasons which, it seems to us, should 
be underlined with particular emphasis in order to describe the 
new situation correctly. 
Ca) The "international financial permissiveness" which, 
as a result of the unprecedented abundance of financial resources 
arising from the oil surpluses and the crisis in the industrial 
centres, made it possible to moderate the effects of the 
payments imbalances and postpone many of the costs of the 
adjustment in international prices. Of course, this also led 
to considerable borrowing, which by the end of 1978 was estimated 
at about US$ 100 billion for the region as a whole. 
This financial permissiveness was a completely new factor 
in the historical experience both of the region and the world as 
a whole. While in most cases the balance-of-pa3niients crisis did 
not have a dramatic impact on internal development, it did make 
it necessary to adjust growth rates and incur substantial loans 
to which we shall refer again below. 
(b) The region's "new capacity to defend its interests", 
which manifested itself in many ways. There is no doubt that 
vital importance was assumed by the progress achieved in previous 
decades in the broadening and diversification of the structure 
of production: that is to say, industrialization in its widest 
sense. In this regard, and with reference to the countries which 
best managed to cope with the setbacks produced by the economic 
situation, a recent report submitted to the Group of 24 points 
out very correctly that: 
"... their capacity for adjustment was substantial because 
of earlier progress that they had made towards the 
diversification of the domestic economy in general and of 
the structure of exports in particular."!/ 
1/ UNDP/UNCTAD, The Balance of Payments Adjustment Process in 
Developing Countries: Report of the Group of Twenty-four, 
New York, January 1979, p. 6. 
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On the other hand, due recognition should be given to the 
high degree of maturity and flexibility achieved by national 
economic policies as a result of the greater experience accured in 
managing the economy at both the public and private levels. 
As a result, adjustment policies of greater or lesser 
scope were introduced in the different countries; a high rate of 
expansion of exports, particularly non-traditional exports, was 
maintained; and high levels were attained in trade within Latin 
America, which functioned as an anti-cyclical factor at a time 
of weakness in international markets. 
No less significant for the region was the marked capacity 
to secure resources from private financial markets and the 
continuation of a high rate of direct or foreign investment by 
the transnational corporations, as is indicated by recent 
secretariat studies. 
The combination of pleiiciful external financing and the 
improvement in the defence capacity of the economies meant that 
although in the majority of the Latin American countries the 
growth rates of the product decreased, they did not do so as 
much as might have been expected in view of the crisis in the 
central economies. 
The cost that this implied in terms of indebtedness has 
already been mentioned, but it was certainly not the only one. 
In social matters there were large-scale setbacks resulting from 
the policies of readjustment and also from the rate of inflation, 
which regained momentum in many countries. Both these types of 
costs had regressive effects on the poorer sectors and on rates 
of investment. 
^• The external factor conditioning the immediate prospects; 
the evolution of the central economies 
It is clear from several points of view that the immediate 
prospects of the regional situation will be strongly influenced, 
in the case of the great majority of the countries of the region, 
by the behaviour of the international economy, which in turn is 
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basically determined by the behaviour of the central economies, 
i.e., by the recovery of their growth rate and the attainment of 
acceptable levels of price stability and equilibrium in their 
balance of payments. 
It would be superfluous on this occasion to attempt to 
analyse the significance and the projections of the present weak 
level of activity of the industrialized countries, on the subject 
of which thousands of pages have been written in recent years. 
It is, however3 both necessary and-possible to highlight some 
aspects of vital interest to our region and to the Third World 
in general. 
Some mistaken analogies have now been dispelled, such as 
the attempt to characterize the present crisis by evoking the 
great depression of the 1930s or the assumption made that this 
crisis was yet another of the transient upsets of the postwar 
period. Neither is the case. 
Instead, the predominant view is that a deep-seated, 
difficult and lasting readjustment is taking place at the level 
of the central economies and the relations between them on the one 
hand and their links with the rest of the world on the other. 
As far as the first element is concerned, the contradictory 
features of this crisis spawned by the economic system of the 
industrial market economy countries are much in evidence. 
In addition to the elements which are common to all crises 
- decline of private investment, reduction of real rates of 
profits, increase in unemployment, growth of idle installed 
capacity - there are others such as active and persistent 
inflation, which represents a notable contrast to the situations 
of deflation typical of such conjuntures in the past. The 
well-known scenario of "stagflation" has created a dilemma which 
is too much for the Keynesian therapies used to solve the problem 
on other occasions and routs them completely: any tendency towards 
growth, in traditional policies, appears to be frustrated by the 
activation of inflationary pressures, while policies directed at 
reducing such pressures tend to aggravate the slowing down of 
production. 
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Although the disequilibria in the external accounts have 
played a substantial role in some countries, it is equally true 
that the same dilemmas also occur in countries with surpluses, 
and in fact this difference in situations constitutes another of 
the seemingly insoluble problems raised by the impotence of 
policies so feverishly pursued or tried out. 
What are the options regarding the immediate prospects of 
the international conjuncture? 
Some main options - which are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive in all aspects - may be deduced from the variety of 
analyses and opinions on the short- and medium-term prospects of 
the present situation. 
The first is that the situation of the last few years 
will continue its precarious existence, with recurring ups and 
dovjns in the priority assigned to and the successes and failures 
achieved in the reactivation of growth and the control of 
inflation and external disequilibria. 
The second is that the obstacles to the more rapid growth 
of the production process and external trade and financial 
transactions will get worse, opening the way for more clearly 
restrictive policies and a situation at least resembling that of 
a traditional or "classical" crisis. 
The third possibility - and certainly the most favourable -
is that the present crisis will culminate in a transition towards 
a more favourable scenario in which the central economies will 
succeed in making the necessary structural and institutional 
adjustments and that this will facilitate new forms of insertion 
in external trade and better opportunities for the development of 
the periphery. 
This option reminds us of the lucid definition given by our 
fondly remembered master, Jose Medina Echeverría, who said that 
in the strict etymological sense a crisis should be understood 
as a certain moment in the evolution of a system which shows 
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sufficient signs of fluctuation and upheaval to indicate a state 
of transition, which does not exclude either" its strengthening and 
recovery or its final breakdown and ruin. 
Let us adopt the relatively optimistic hypothesis that we 
are living in a period of readjustments which will later evolve 
into a broader and more favourable course for the world economy. 
It seems reasonable to suppose that even in such a case 
the transition will involve some years of risks and sacrifices 
which will be very different for countries of the periphery like 
those of Latin America. These risks will perhaps be more serious 
than those experienced in the last part of the present decade, 
and it is consequently essential to prepare for tackling and 
overcoming them. 
The first risk arises out of the continuing situation of 
slow growth and persistent inflation in the central countries. 
This stands in the way of the necessary growth of our exports 
and makes imports continually more expensive. This general 
effect becomes worse in proportion as the industrial countries 
resort to policies which aim at the reduction rather than the 
necessary expansion of growth and trade through the structural 
adjustments required in their domestic economies. 
In this respect it is of interest to recall some recent 
statements. At a meeting of the Group of 24 held in March this 
yéar, the communique issued by the Ministers present "expressed 
dismay at the proliferation of trade restrictions in the 
developed countries". Another forum carrying considerable 
weight - the Interim Committee of the Board of Governors on 
the International Monetary System - announced that since its 
last analysis of the world economic situation in September 1978 
•'there had been some worsening of the prospects for economic 
growth in the industrieal countries, increasing inflation, a 
slow rate of expansion in international trade and a tendency in 
some countries to resort to protectionist measures". 
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These developments in external conditions are already being 
reflected in the economies of the countries of the region, although 
with notable differences between one country and another: not only 
between the oil-exporting countries and the rest but also within 
each group. 
Thus, it can easily be seen that despite the efforts made 
the deficits on current account still stand at very high levels 
compared with the beginning of the decade, while there has been a 
continuous increase in the amounts of indebtedness in respect of 
indebtedness in respect of private credit, which has constituted 
the bulk of the net inflow of capital (see table 1). 
In global terms, the situation does not appear alarming 
at this stage in terms of such current relations as the ratio of 
payments of interest and amortization on the external debt, plus 
remittances of prifits, to the value of exports, but - exceptions 
apart - it is none the less true that there is good reason to be 
concerned that these trends may continue. 
The second risk is that the relatively abundant supply of 
external credit cannot be considered a prop on which it will be 
possible to rely indefinitely. This is so because the copious 
liquidity of the market and the easy access to it are the result 
of exceptional conditions which can hardly continue in the future, 
quite apart from the fact that its terms .and costs are frequently 
not in keeping with the requirements of development financing. 
It should therefore be understood that the chances of 
continued use of international credit by the debtor countries 
necessarily depend on their ability ti^  rectify the basic 
imbalances in their external accounts by taking the positive 
approach of increasing and diversifying their exports rather than 
by a severe restriction of their purchases abroad. 
As is well known, this second option would also harm the 
industrialized economies by weakening or eliminating one of the 
factors which have stimulated their shaky economic growth in 
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As is well known, this second option would also harm the 
industrialized economies by eakening or eliminating one of the 
factors which have stimulated their shaky economic growth in 
recent years, namely, the demand stemming from their sales to 
the periphery. 
The third risk is the impact of the present situation of 
the central economies on the region .'s growth rate and on 
inflationary pressures, as we pointed out earlier. 
While the region is today better able to defend itself than 
in the past, it would face a much more severe challenge if the 
restrictive effects stemming from the central economies were to 
continue for a protracted period. 
The picture is even gloomier if one considers the potential 
inflation. Although in 1977 and 1978 the rate of price increases 
declined in comparison with the high levels of earlier years, it 
is nevertheless true that inflation continued to pose difficult 
problems of control and management in a sizeable number of 
countries which have considerable weight in the regional total. 
The picture is therefore very unfavourable as regards the objective 
of keeping up the growth rate, and in addition it involves 
sacrifices and social inequalities which hinder the concerted 
determination on all sides required to advance towards a solution. 
- l i -
l i . THE GREAT CHALLENGES OF TEffi COMING DECADE 
The basic question which emerges as we stand on the threshold of 
a new decade is what major challenges Latin America will face during 
the next ten years. 
If an adequate answer is to be given to this question» the analysis 
of the main features of the economic conjuncture in recent years is 
not enough. A retrospective view is also required5 to enable us to make 
an appraisal of the economic and social evolution of the region in the 
context of a long-term historical perspective. 
This appraisal would lead to the following main conclusions: 
1. Since the war 3 and particularly during the 1960s and the early 
years of the present decade, the region as a whole - with exceptions 
which this is not the moment to analyse - achieved vigorous development 
of its forces of production. 
This development was analysed in some detail in previous presentations 
by the Executive Secretaria.t, so that onl^ its most essential features 
need to be summed up here. These were^ , firstlys the sustained growth 
of the Latin American econcmy., which meant that in 1975 the joint product 
of the region had increased fivefold since 1950:, secondly, the growth 
and diversification of Latin American exports, which continued even through 
the recent recession in the world econatny:. and lastly, the improvement 
of the capacity for handling econoidc policy to be observed in the Latin 
American countries, to which I referred earlier. 
2. This definite substantial material progress, however, was not able 
to solve some of Latin America's most acute and serious social problems. 
Modernization and progress, in fact, only benefited certain strata of 
society. Others, particularly the great masses, remained outside this 
progress or only received its benefits marginally. Owing to this basic 
feature of the development style which tended to prevail in the majority 
of the region's economies, the number of people affected by critical 
poverty continued to be intolerably high, unentployment and particularly 
underemployment did m t decrease significantly, and some social indicators 
improved only slowly or even showed signs of deterioration. 
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The developanent of the last thirty years was thus marked by a basic 
ambivalence. While on the one hand it revealed tiie region's capacity 
for increasing its natericil output at a fairly high rate, on the other 
it reflected a flagrant inability to distribute fairly the results of this 
more rapid material progress. It is this essential ambivalence in the 
development style which explains the contrast between the optimistic 
conclusions vMch m y be drawn from the evolution of some conventional 
economic indicators, such as those referring to the growth rate of the 
product, exports or international reserves5 and the sometimes discouraging 
conclusions arising out of certain social indicators which show that in 
many countries of the region acute problems of malnutrition, poverty, 
illiteracy and underenployment continue to exist. In some cases 
their solution is desperately slow, and in others it is even more 
distressing to note actual worsening of the situation o 
3. These characteristics of internal economic change were accompanied 
by an increasing internationalization of the Latin American economies 
which strengthened the lin]<3 between their development processes and 
changes in the world econony. 
The process of internationalization represented a new dynamic 
growth factor for certain countries but also involved a new and perilous 
vulnerability. The latter took shape with particular clarity when, in 
the middle of the present decade, the great growth cycle of the world 
economy which had begun early in the 1950s was inteirrupted and the trend 
towards a liberalization of international trade was simultaneously 
paralysed. In recent years, as a resialt of these closer links with the 
exterior, the rates and forms of growth of the central countries have 
become basic conditioning factors of the rate of internal development 
of many of our economies. 
The relative iiiportance of the three basic characteristics of Latin 
American development which I have just mentioned has, of course, varied 
greatly in the different countries of the region. All the same, these 
three basic characteristics which sum up the achievements, shortccmings 
and vulnerable features of the development procees in the last 30 years 
are repeated to scsne extent in the experience of the great majorits^ of our 
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economies and become evident when their evolution is viewed from the 
perspective of the last few years of this decade. 
What we consider to be the three fund^ental challenges which the 
countries of Latin America will have to face in the next decade thus emerge 
very clearly and can be expressed in the form of three questions: 
(1) Is it possible to improve the social spread of the development 
style which predominates in the region? 
(2) Is it possible also to maintain and if possible speed up the 
m t e of economic growth? 
(3) Is it possible to design defence mechanisms against the 
instability and uncertainty which characterize the present world scenario 
so as to reduce the effects of the new external vulnerability of the Latin 
American development process? 
An affirmative answer to each of these questions would mean that 
in the next decade the region can indeed progress towards fair^ dynamic 
and autpnomous developnent, 
I should now like to go on to make some brief remarks on the 
possibilities of and requisitesfo^ achievinf each of these three 
basic services. 
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A. The first challenge and requirement; broadening the 
social impact of growth 
As I mentioned earlier, it is a widely accepted fact that the 
dynamic growth of the region in the post-war period bypassed, 
in relative or absolute terms, a sizeable part of the population. 
I do not intend to dwell on this topic, which I have dealt 
with at length in speeches at earlier sessions. On this occasion 
I should merely like to recall that a recent CEPAL study, covering 
six countries which account for 70% of the population and an equal 
proportion of the gross product of Latin America, found that in 
those countries per capita income rose by 25% in the period 1960-197 
a figure which is certainly satisfactory. Only 10% of this growth, 
however, benefitce^. those who were below a certain poverty line 
in 1960-, while 60% of it was absorbed by the richest 20% of the 
population. Thus, in absolute terms the of the population who 
were poor in 1960 increased their per capita income by only 
20 dollars between then and 1970. Furthermore, according to the 
latest available data, in 1970 about 40% of the Latin American 
population suffered from extreme poverty and almost half of these 
could be considered indigent. Although the incidence of poverty 
varied enormously from country to country, as may be seen from 
table 2, this percentage means that in 1970 the poor of the region 
numbered almost 110 million, of whom 5U million were indigent. 
With all the limitations involved in making a projection, 
and merely in order to be able to visualize the urgency of the 
changes which must be made in the forms of development which have 
so far characterized Latin America, it may be noted that if recent 
trends continue, by the year 2000 the poor of our region will have 
increased in absolute figures, although they will represent a smallc 
proportion of the total population. And what is more serious, the 
income gap between rich and poor will have increased alarmingly, a 
fact which runs counter to basic moral principles, has no 
s.. 




ESTIMATES OF THE INCIDENCE OF EXTREME POVERTY IN SOME LATIN 
AMERICAN COUNTRIES AROUND 1970 a/ 
Country 
Percentage of households 
below the poverty line 
Percentage of households 
below the indigence line 
Urban Rural National Urban Rural National 
Argentina 5 19 8 1 1 1 
Brazil 35 73 49 15 42 25 
Chile 12. 25 17 . 3 11 6 
Colombia 38 54 45 14 23 18 
Costa Rica 15 30 24 5 7 6 
Honduras 40 75 65 15 57 45 
Mexico 20 49 34 6 1.8 12 
Peru 28 68 50 8 39 25 
Uruguay 10 9 • • o • • 4 • 0 « • • • 
Venezuela 20 36 25 6 19 10 
Latin America 26 62 40 10 34 19 
Source; Oscar Altimir, La dimension de la pobreza en Araerica 
Latina, E/CEPAL/L. 18 0 , 1978 , p, 81". 
a/ The ten countries considered account for 84-% of the 
population of Latin America. 
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The other fact of capital importance to which I should like 
to refer is that unquestionably most of the managing cadres - in 
the governments professional and intellectual circles, political 
parties and basic institutions such as churches, the armed forces, 
trades unions and business associations - agree on the urgent need 
to tackle this specific problem with the utmost priority. This 
implies that the're are few people who still believe that a dynamic 
growth process will suffice for the problem to solve itself. 
Naturally enoughs there are differencesj sometimes profund, in 
the diagnoses and remedies suggested or adopted, but this overall 
consensus is certainly of fundamental importance, for the collective 
awakening to the problem is not only a new development but also 
the prime and most essential condition for beginning to solve it. 
The nature of the challenge facing us is certainly very complex 
since without losing sight of the growth objective, which I will 
discuss later, we must find a means of achieving social justice5 
without renouncing the modernization of society we must give 
preferential treatm.ent to the groups which have not yet benefited 
from technological progress; and without neglecting the excellence 
necessary in the training of certain groups in our communities, 
we must broaden and improve the system of opportunities and rewards 
in such a way as to involve actively large groups in Latin American 
society who are still excluded from the decisions which affect 
their living conditions. 
1. '^ he CÍ7.G of i^ iS social challenres 
One factor closely linked with the situations of critical 
poverty encountered in the regions is that of demographic trends. 
The projections made by CELADE indicate that although there will 
be a slight drop in the population growth rate from 19 80 onwards, 
in the remainder of this century the Latin American population 
will increase by 75% (see table 3). At the same time, migration from 
the countryside to the toxms will continue, especially in the 
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Table 3 
LATIN AMERICA: TOTAL POPULATION BY COUNTRIES 
(In thousands of inhabitants at mid-year) 
1950 1978 2 0 0 0 
Latin America 160 271 344 168 601 247 
Argentina 17 150 26 395 32 861 
Bahamas 79 220 330 
Barbados 211 249 285 
Bolivia 2 703 5 285 9 299 
Brazil 52 901 119 477 212 507 
Chile 6 091 10 732 14 934 
Colombia 11 597 25 614 42 441 
Costa Rica 958 2 111 3 377 
Cuba 5 858 9 718 12 717 
Dominican Republic 2 361 5 653 9 333 
Ecuador 3 307 7 543 14 596 
El Salvador 1 940 4 524 8 708 
Guatemala 2 962 6 839 12 739 
Guyana 423 846 1 256 
Haiti 3 097 5 534 9 860 
Honduras 1 401 3 439 6 978 
Jamaica 1 403 2 115 2 726 
Mexico 26 606 65 421 132 244 
Nicaragua 1 109 2 559 5 154 
Panama 825 1 808 2 823 
Paraguay 1 371 • 2 888 5 274 
Peru 7 832 16 821 29 468 
Suriname 215 461 904 
Trinidad and Tobago 632 1 041 1 280 
Uruguay 2 194 2 886 3 448 
Venezuela 5 145 13 989 25 705 
Source: CELADE, Boletín Demográfico^ 
January 1979. 
N® 23, Santiago, Chile, 
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countries where the percentage of the population living in rural 
areas remains very high^ and where the incidence of critical 
poverty is greatest. All this will increase the pressures on 
services and physical space in the urban zones. 
Furthermore 3 due to changes in the age structure of the 
population, the proportion of the total population represented 
by persons of active age will increase, and this, combined V7ith 
higher rates of participation by womenj will generate an increase 
in the labour force, estimated at an annual average of nearly 3%, 
with the total rising from 170 million in 1975 to 345 million at 
the end of the century. 
A number of studies of the region show that if the current 
style of development continues unchanged, the growth rate needed 
to maintain cur2Pent unemployment levels would be well above' the 
rates achieved by most of the countries of the region in recent' 
decades - rates which were actua.lly the highest ever recorded. 
The rapid growth of the labour force certainly represents 
an important challenge to the capacity for job creation of the 
countries of the region-, and this challenge increases still further 
if it is r-ecalled that it will also be necessary to increase the 
productivity and incomes of those who asi'e currently vegetating in 
backward activities or are suffering from different forms of 
underemployment. In this latter respect, the estimates of the 
International Labour Office show that underemployment affects 
nearly 30% of the labour force. In short, the problem is not only 
one of reducing unemployment but also of absorbing underemployment 
so as ensure opportunities for productive and well-remunerated 
vjork for the entire labour force. 
As will be understood, however, there are other social 
challenges which must urgently be dealt with • c^^.cation for examj 
Frequent reference is made to the major advances achieved here, 
but the shortcomings which still exist are overlooked. 
25 
It is a fact that considerable progress has been made in 
increasing the access of the population to the educational systenic 
Between 1960 and 1975, th© coverage of primary education doubled 
in absolute terms, secondary enrolment increased five-fold and 
enrolment in hi^ -her education increased more than six fold. It is also 
true, however., that despite the substantial effort made ^  illiterac 
in a considerable number of countries of the region was still very 
high in 1970, while the average educational level of the labour 
force was still low and the proportion of vjorkers without schoolii 
was very high (see table 4), This last fact is particularly 
important since., as may be observed from recent CEPAL studies a 
the great majority of heads of households in situations of 
poverty have three years of schooling or less. It may also be 
noted that the incidence of poverty drops drastically when the 
head of the household has com.pleted full prim.ary education. 
The foregoing is a reflection of the fact that the proportio 
of students vjho complete the primary cycle in Latin America is 
still very low, although there are substantial differences betweei 
countries, A study of 18 countries shows that around 1975 .less tl 
50% .of the__students.__who _had. enrolJLed..in primary edu 6 years 
previously „h.a_d _complete^d ti^, cycl .than_half. jthe drop-
outs. were in the first three years of schooling and thus ran a 
great risk of becoming illiterates from lack of practice. 
From another standpoint the tendency towards a predominant] 
urban labour force and the increasing numbers of persons graduatir 
from the educational systems mean that new i "b -seekers come up 
against a labour m.arket vjhich offers fewer opportunities than are 
required at nearly all levels« and this creates insecurity and 
frustration, both among young people with little education and 
those who have succeeded in com.pleting their secondary education. 
Indeed, in some countries this situation is emerging even among 
graduates from higher education, who are not succeeding in 
finding jobs in keeping with their training and aspirations. 
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Table 4 
LATIN AMERICA: EDUCATIONAL INDICATORS OF THE LABOUR 
FORCE AROUND 1970 
Country 
Average level of education 
of the economically active 
population (years of 
schooling) 





Argentina 7.2 4.0 
Brazil 3,1 36.0 
Chile •5.8 8,2 
Colombia 3.9 21.6 
Costa Rica 4.8 10.8 
Hond.ura.s 2.5 42. 5 
Mexico 3.5 27.1 
Panama• 5.2 17.1 
Peru 4.5 19.3 
Uruguay 5.7 4.9 
Venezuela 3.6 0 • • 
Source: Data taken from the CEPAL/UNICEF project on social 
stratification and mobility in Latin A-aerica; 1975 . 
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2. Mission; possible; 
Although these and other related facts give some idea of the 
vast size of the tasks to be faced, I am convinced that these are 
not insuperr?.ble. 
The economic grovjth of the region in recent decades ^  the 
noteworthy progress in technical knowledge, and the incorporation of 
increasingly large numbers of professionals trained in the management 
of public affairs constitute a group of factors which, united.with 
a firm political will, may well remedy the social inadequacies that 
cause us so much concern. My optimism is thus not purely rhetorical. 
Recent studies on the problem show that the additional income 
which would have been required around 19 70 to bring the income of 
the poor groups up to the estimated minimum for covering the basic 
overall consumption budget was equivalent to approximately 61 of 
the total disposable income of Latin American households or 12% 
of the disposable income of the richest 10% of the population. 
From another standpoint, it would have represented about 22% of 
total public expenditure for the region as a whole. 
These values, of course^ hide wide variations between countries 
where the deficit expressed as a proportion of total personal income 
ranged from 0.6% to 20%., while as a proportion of public expenditure 
it varied between 3% and over 100%. 
These relationships between the seriousness of the situations 
and the amount of national income or total disposable household incon 
clearly shows that when a point has been•reached, as has happened in 
Latin America, where average per capita income is four times the figure 
corresponding to the poverty line, the eradication of poverty appears 
as an economically feasible task.l/ 
If the problem is examined from the standpoint of some basic 
deficiencies, much the same conclusions are reached. 
1/ The per capita gross domestic product; expressed in dollars 
at that year's prices, was 886 dollars in 1970 and the 
estimated poverty line at that time was a little over 
2 00 dollars. 
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(a) It is estimated that between one-third and two-fifths of 
the- population of I^tin America suffers from nutritional deficienc: 
since their calorie consumption is below the minimum requirements 
recommended by specialized international agencies. Taking as a 
reference the cost of the basket of foodstuffs used to determine 
the poverty line, it is estimated that Latin America's nutritional 
deficiencies represent.between 1 and 2.5% of the regional gross 
product. 
(b) As regards the educational deficit, it is estimated that 
the additional cost of providing six years of primary schooling fo: 
the future cohorts would amount to somewhere between 0,3 and 0,5% c 
the region's gross domestic product, while the additional expenditi 
required to finance an adequate health system would absorb 1 to 1,£ 
of the regional gross product, 
• (c) Finally; with respect to housing,, it is assumed-that 
about 1% of the gross national product would have to be transferrec 
to the poorest families so that their expenditure on housing could 
be equivalent to that incurred by families whose income is equal 
to the poverty line. ,.- . • 
In short, to solve those deficits would involve reassigning 
income aiiiounting to between 3,3 and 5.5% of the regional total, 
which does not seem too ambitious an objective. 
Obviously 5 however J it is not a question here of merely, 
transferring income from one destination to another» or from the 
rich to the poor. After the financial transfer - and the difficuH 
which by its very nature this involves - real and perhaps bigger 
and more complex obstacles arise. The operation really requires 
the transformation of. some structural profiles and, in the final 
analysis 5 of the mode of-.operation of the economic., social and 
political system. Only thus can the existing distr-ibution pattern; 
be permanently altered., in a context of adequate productive dynamie 
which will guarantee highe.2^  real incomes on a stable basis for the 
poorer groupsj without jeopardizing economic growth to the print 
of frustrating^ the income distribution attempt. 
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It is not surprising 3 therefore, that the consideration of 
these problems should have opened an active discussion on the 
nature of the policies and expedients capable of appreciably 
improving the distribution of the fruits of technical progress 
and erradicating the critical poverty scenarios. 
Stages of a redistribution 
In this discussion - which is raised today in every kind of 
international forum ~ there emerge three lines of action and 
thinking: one deals basically with the problem of critical_ povertj 
a second enlarges on this concern and extends it to the field of 
basic needs; and a third integrates those objectives and subordina 
them to the formulation of a global strategy for change, capable 
of modifying the original bases of the situations of deficiency 
and inequality. 
It is not possible to enter into a detailed examination of 
these positions 5 all of which arc perfectly respectable. Let us 
merely say that from our own point of view vie see no absolute 
contradictions between themj but only stages of a process which 
should integrate them according to the material, social and 
political conditions prevailing in each country. 
We have no doubt that only a strategy which alters the 
structural bases and m-ode of operation of the global system can 
provide the whole answer to the complex problem we have before us. 
This does not meanj howeverj that we cannot propose and pursue 
more restricted and specific aims such as those linked with the 
campaigns against poverty or for the satisfaction of basic needs, 
which will help the collective conscience to simmer and mature, 
and provide concrete experience that will facilitate the attainmen 
of more ambitious goals. 
Let us examine some features of these three courses of 
action. 
- 30 -
(a) The critical poverty approach 
It will take time for the permanently favourable effects of 
the radical changes which must be introduced in the distribution 
patterns to be felt by the poorest population groups. Therefore .j 
it is necessary to design specific policies with a view to 
satisfying the most elementary needs of poor fajtiilics as 
efficiently as possible and within the shortest possible time. 
Nutrition, educationhealth., housing and sanitary conditio! 
among others, are areas of intervention in x^ rhich experience in 
Latin America has shovm a greater or lesser degree of success. 
Notwithstanding the efforts made., these can be said to have been 
insufficient 5 both because of the volume of resources assigned to 
those aims and because of the relatively limited proportion that 
has reached the extremely poor sectors. It is therefore necessary 
to revise the criteria for assigning public resources, especially 
in the social sectors, and also to maJce a genuine effoi-t to 
increase the taxation of those groups which have, reaped most 
benefit from economic grovjth.^  with the object of providing the 
resources required to face the extreme poverty emergency. 
Furthermore, the institutionality in force and the bureaucr¿ 
administrative practices are not the most suitable to take care 
of the poor population. This is because the.decisions adopted 
in the social sectors are generally unco-ordinated and the 'targe' 
groups'- are not clearly defined. As regards the bureaucratic 
administrative.; aspects, compliance with the rules and regulations 
calls for educational and other conditions which are npt easily 
fulfilled by the population which is ultimately meant to be 
favoured. 
These.assistance-oriented policies, even if their coverage 
increases and their implementation improves , are not of course th^-
solution to the poverty problem but merely help to palliate its 
most degrading features. This is what underlies the objective 
of overcoming extreme poverty as the first stage of a development 
strategy aimed at achieving greater social equality. 
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(b) The basic needs approach 
A second stage, which dif fers from the f i r s t because of i t s 
broader objectives, the means that have to be ut i l i zed and i t s 
dynamic concept^ consists of the satisfaction of basic human 
needs. These do not refer only to the deficiencies found in 
extreme poverty, measured in absolute terms, but to those which, 
including that minimum stage, permit self-sustained development 
through the crcation of productive emplojnnent and levels of 
income which permit the persons concerned to be integrated in the 
economic.; social and po l i t i c a l l i f e of their national societies. 
In other words besides satisfying certain minim.um material needs 
the aim is to cover needs which, not being of a material kind, 
constitute essential elements of a society involving greater 
participation, equality and sol idar i ty. 
A f i r s t problem which arises in the satisfaction of basic 
needs is the choice of a cr i ter ion for defining them. Obviously, 
a universally val id prescription cannot be given , but the cr i ter ia 
should be determined according to the conditions prevailing in 
each country., and even within the national frontiers some of those 
needs w i l l vary from one region to another. This information 
depends on the sovereignty of each country, a fact which must be 
made perfectly clear. 
Once a cr i ter ion for identifying the basic needs to be 
satisf ied and the groups to be favoured has been adopted by the 
po l i t i ca l authorities, the strategy should specify the direct and 
indirect means for attaining the objectives. In this stage i t is 
especially important to make sure that the policies designed to 
increase the income of the poor are not counteracted by a r ise 
in the prices of the goods and services they consume, or that 
the productivity increments are not translated into higher monetar; 
income. This means that the increased purchasing power in the 
hands of the poor w i l l real ly be converted into greater permanent 
well-being based on changes in the magnitude and structure of 
supply. 
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In view of the limited resources of the Latin American 
countries 5 the satisfaction of basic needs should be compatible 
with other objectives, such as the need for sustained grovjth. 
the divers i f icat ion of the production system^ less external 
dependence in terms of both products and marketsthe maintenance 
of certain basic equi l ibr ia and the legitimate consumer 
aspirations of the middle-income groups. 
^^^ The integrated change appr9ach 
The foregoing stages necessarily lead'to a third stage;, 
which consists of incorporation the previous two stages in a 
global development strategy aimed at eliminating contradictions 
between objectives and making the pol icies consistent with one 
another. 
The choice of the two primary objectives of eradicating 
poverty and satisfyi.ng basic needs s in their dynamic and structur 
change approach, should be integrated in a strategy which w i l l 
simultaneously achieve the capital formation required to sustain 
the expansion of productive capacity. Experience shows that the 
spontaneous action of market forces tends to reproduce the 
inequalities of the existing distr ibution pattern and, of course; 
f a i l s to assign the resources to the production of goods and 
services consumed by the poorest groups because of the small 
percentage of income they manage to obtain. Moreover, in" mány 
cases, private investment does not respond as quickly as i t 
should to purely economic incentives. 
These considerations just i fy a more active participation b\ 
the State, both in f u l f i l l i n g the redistribution objectives and 
in achieving the level of accumulation and structure of investmer 
suited to the grovith objectives and the reorientation of the 
production structure. This in no way implies ignoring the 
important role of the market •, i í merely points to the need to recognize^  
that the S ta te ' fu l f i l s an irreplaceable function in a strategy 
which assigns pr ior i ty to the eradication of poverty and the 
satisfaction of basic needs. 
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It i s an empirically proven fact that the great social 
inequalities are linked with the structural heterogeneity of the 
productive systems. That is to say, the co-existence of broad 
informal or tradit ional sectors where technical progress has not 
yet arrived 5 with modern act iv i t ies in which advanced technologic 
are used. Therefore, i f i t i s desired to compatibilize growth 
with a reduction of the existing inequalit ies, the expansion of 
the modern sectors should be able to sustain a dynamic demand 
for employments and a proportion of i t s surpluses should help to 
raise productivity in the backward and informal ac t iv i t ies . 
Let us recapitulate: the greatest challenge facing the 
governm.ents of the region is the need to assign preferential and 
immediate attention to the most seriously af f l i c ted groups; to 
promote the creation of employment in order to m.ake f u l l use of 
the labour force at sufficient levels of remuneration to satisfy 
i t s basic needs: and to incorporate the marginal sectors in the 
production process, mainly through the proper generation and 
channelling of investment resources. 
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B. The second challen?:e and requirement; to 
ciccelerr.te the cccnorac j:-;rowth rate 
^ • The.econonic p;rov7th iniperative 
The more equitable distr ibution of" the f ru i ts of progress 
and the eradication of c r i t i c a l poverty in a h is tor ica l ly short 
time are then, in our view, basic objectives of Latin America's 
development policy.. Clearly, however, in order to achieve them 
the region.wi l l require not only to raise i t s modest rate of 
economic, growth of the past four years, but systew.ticall^/ attain 
a very high rate of expansion. 
Please understand me. To propose .this does not, of course, 
mean to subscribe to the ingenuous theory that the evident 
situations of lack or inequality prevailing in the region wil l, 
r ight them.selves with econom.ic growth.. Very much to the contrary. 
As CEPAL has always maintained, to grow is important, but growth 
is not enough. No less important, in fact, i s hov? to grow and 
for whom. We have therefore repeatedly advocated that in order 
to attain genuine and fa i r econom.ic growth in Latin America i t i s 
indispensable that not a few of the styles of developm.ent prevailing 
in most countries of the region should be changed. 
To accept this by no m.eans implies, however, underestimating 
the main significance of the accelerated and constant expansion 
of the production base of the economy, nor overlooking the 
decisive contribution i t can make towards a development strategy 
aimed at improving the well-being and the employment opportunities 
and progress of the tradi t ional ly underprivileged groups.. 
From this point of view, the rapid and sustained growth of 
the economy is essential in order, f i r s t , to provide productive 
well-paid employment for the huge contingents annually joining 
the labour force and, secondly, to raise the productivity and 
income of the considerable proportion of the labour force which 
is currently affected by the various forms of under~employment. 
The achievement of these two objectives constitutes, as is well 
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known, one of the most fundamental conditions of any policy aimed 
at satisfying the basic needs of the population and permanently 
ensuring a more equitable distr ibution of income. But a as we have 
said, in the remainder of the century the region's labour force 
w i l l increase very rapidly3 and at present about 30% of i t suffers 
the effects of under-employment. Consequently, in order to satisfy 
the minimum but essential requirement of providing productive well-
paid employment for the whole labour force, the economy w i l l 
necessarily have to expand at a very high rate. 
The need for intensive and sustained economic growth is also 
evident i f the implications of a redistr ibutive policy are analysed 
from the angle of the real production structure. A more equitable 
distribution of income would lead to substantial changes in the 
composition of domestic demand in favour of essential goods. So 
that the prices of these goods should not r ise out of a l l proportion 
- thus largely cancelling out the effects of redistribution of 
monetary income - i t would be necessary to increase their 
production signif icantly and continuously. 
Moreover, in order real ly and effectively to improve the 
l iv ing levels and.productive capacity of the poorest sectors, i t 
would be im.perative to increase education, health, recreation and 
housing services also to a m.arked extent. A l l this would in i t se l f 
create important pressures on the production system. Added to them 
would be the pressures generated by increased demand for these 
goods and services and also by the demand for other less essential 
goods and services from the middle-income groups, whose importance 
and growing significance in the majority of the countries of the 
region should not be overlooked. 
In these circumstances, the maintenance of a high rate of 
economic growth is also indispensable in order to cover effectively, 
permanently and simultaneously the basic needs of the hitherto 
underprivileged groups, and the needs deriving from the legitimate 
aspirations of the middle-income sectors. 
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Finally3 a continuous and rapid expansion, of the economy 
would help to increase the po l i t i ca l v i ab i l i t y of a development 
strategy aimed at eradicating extreme poverty and improving the 
distr ibution of income. These objectives, by definit ion, imply 
that the more unfavourable is the i n i t i a l situation of the various 
groups, the more rapidly their levels of income and consumption 
must grow. In a stat ic economy or one which grows only slowly, 
such a relat ive differentiat ion in the growth rate of the income 
of the various sectors vjould require an absolute decrease in the 
income of the richest groups, which would certainly contribute 
to their opposition to the redistribution programme. This 
po l i t i ca l obstacle would, in contrast, be much less of a hindrance 
in a society in' which global production expanded steadily 'and 
rapidly. In that event, the relat ive difference in the rates of 
increase in income of the various groups would be compatible with 
the increase in the absolute amount of income in a l l sec Lora, 
including the richest, and therefore the pol it ' ical v i ab i l i t y of 
the redistr ibution strategy would be greater. 
Accordingly, whether redistr ibution is analysed from the 
angle of i t s employm.ent requirements, or 'of the changes i t assumes 
in the real structure of production, or i t s po l i t i ca l determinants, 
the achievement of a high and persistent rate of growth is an 
indispensable although insuff ic ient requisite of á programme aimed 
at eradicating extreme poverty and distr ibuting the benefits of 
general economic progress on a more equitable basis. 
2.. • Possibil ity, of growth: the region's 
potential 
The rapid summary I have made of some of the main reasons 
why the accelerated expansion of the economy constitutes an essentia 
component of a redistr ibutive strategy in the Latin American context 
naturally leads to the question of whether such accelerated economir 
growth i s possible in the region. 
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As recent experience has clearly shown, the answer to 
that question partly depends on factors which are external 
to the region and are mainly linked with the evolution of 
the central economies, the policies they adopt (particularly 
in connexion with trade), and the progress made by the world 
community tov/ards establishing a new international economic 
order which w i l l be fairer and more favourable to the development 
of the economies of the Third V/orld. Furthermore, any answei-^  
to this question would have different meanings for the various 
countries of the region, whose growth poss ib i l i t ies and prospects 
are, of course, very different. 
Be that as i t may -.and taking these l imitations into 
account - I consider that the ansvjer to this fundamental 
question is essentially affirmative. In fact, in my opinion, 
a rapid and sustained process of economic growth is not only 
necessary in Latin America but is also possible. 
This view - one of hopéful but rea l i s t i c optimism - i s based 
fundamentally on the region's vast potential i t ies and on the 
evident -. though s t i l l insuff ic ient - progress made recently in 
ut i l i z ing them more fu l ly than in the past. 
This vast potential - whose f u l l real izat ion constitutes one 
of the great challenges which Latin America w i l l have to face 
in the remainder of the century - is based on four fundamental 
factors: the natural resources base, the magnitude and s k i l l of 
i t s human resources, i t s capital goods production potential, 
and the size of the market. 
Let us br ief ly reca l l some basic data on each of these 
factors and formulate, also very br ief ly , some considerations 
on their significance for the attainment of an accelerated 
growth rate. 
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(a) The natural rèsource base 
It i s common knowledge that in the last few years, 
part icularly since the h is tor ica l adjustment of the price of 
o i l at the end of 1973; there has been an evident and fu l ly 
just i f ied revaluation of the role of natural resources in the 
development process. This has led to the renewed discovery of 
the obvious principle - often forgotten in the recent past -
that the ava i lab i l i ty of a broad and varied natural resources 
base constitutes a condition which, while not in i t s e l f 
guaranteeing the attainment of a high rate of growth, largely 
fac i l i ta tes this task to the extent that i t i s accompanied by 
policies leading to the rational u t i l i za t ion of such resources. 
From this viewpoint, and i f consideration is given to the 
region as a whole, Latin America is obviously in a privileged 
position. As dist inct from, other areas of the Third World and 
the majority of the industrial ized countries, Latin America 
possesses a relat ive abundance of arable land and some countries 
of the region s t i l l have an agricultural frontier. Thus, 
according to preliminary calculations, i t i s estimated that the 
potential ly arable areas of the whole of Latin America is close 
to 575 mi l l ion hectares," of which some 170 mi l l ion are cultivated 
at present. Naturally, these figures are subject to a wide • 
margin of error and i t would be a m.istake to conclude from them 
that the cultivated area can expand' rapidly and easily within 
the short term. Clearly, however, the existence of a 
considerable area which can gradually be incorporated in the 
land under cult ivat ion is a relat ively exceptional possib i l i ty 
in the world context, whose economic significance should not 
be underestimated. 
Latin America also possesses a broad and varied base of 
mineral resources. Although i t must be borne in mind that there 
are huge areas of the region whose mining potential has not yet 
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been explored by means of modern techniques, the known reserves 
of some minerals are impressive. Thus, for example, Latin 
America's reserves of copper represent one-third of the world 
total , those of bauxite more than one-quarter, and those of 
iron one-fifth. At the present rate of production, the'known 
reserves of iron are expected to last 225 years, those of bauxite 
nearly 200 yearsj those of copper one century, and those of 
nickel over 80 years (see table 5). 
Moreover, in the last few years Latin America's position 
has improved dramatically as regards petroleum and gas reserves, 
and the region also possesses an enormous hydroelectric potential. 
Suffice i t to reca l l that this hydroelectric potential i s one-
third greater than that of the Soviet Union, that i t more than 
doubles the combined potential of the United States and Canada, 
and that i t quadruples the tota l potential of Europe. What is 
not less important is that not more than 15% of that potential 
is ut i l i zed at present and, therefore, there are great development 
poss ib i l i t ies in this f i e ld too. 
(b) The new labour force 
The ava i lab i l i ty of abundant and diversif ied natural 
resources is undoubtedly a propitious factor for achieving a rapid 
and stable economic growth. It i s not less evident, however, 
that the real izat ion of the development potential impl ic i t in 
that natural resources base depends on the simultaneous 
existence of other factors, part icular ly work aptitudes, sk i l l s 
and vocation and saving by the population. 
If we consider the world scene, we w i l l f ind that among the 
countries which have reached satisfactory levels of economic 
development there are some which have possessed r ich and varied 
natural resources, and others which, on the contrary, have had 
a somewhat modest and undiversified base of primary resources. 
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Table 5 



















Bauxite 4 360 OOO • 26.0 22 082 197 
Copper 150 000 33.0 1 494 100 
Tin 1 597 16.0 40 40 
Iron 19 800 000 20.0 87 834 225 
Nickel 5 500 9.0 67 82 
Lead 12 000 7;0 440': 27 
Zinc •000 9.0 936 . 15 
Source: Mineral Facts and Problems: Metal Stat ist ics 1967-1977 
a/ At the 1977 rate of production. 
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A l l of themj however, whatever their pcl it ico- inst i tut ional 
regimes have had one fundamental feature in conmon, and that 
i s that the prolonged process of eoononic expansion and 
continuous iiicrease in productivity has been preceded, or at 
least accompaniad, by a substantial "-is^ in the educational 
levGjc 3nd« above a l l , by a genuine universalisation of basic 
education <, 
Fr.'om this standpoints there is s t i l l jauch to be done in 
the countries of Latin /aaericao On tho other hand, i t V 7 0 u l d be 
neitbier fa i r nor rea l i s t i c to ignore the progress achieved in 
this fiej.do These advances - ih^perceptible perhaps i f viewed 
within a short-term perspective and mox'e irtensive in soroe 
countries than others ~ have transformed and substantially 
improved tbe ritructore of s'Kiils of tlie Latin Aiaerican 
population o 
As a result of this progress the labour force of the 
region is c\t present radicalI37 different from that vi-hich 
existed .J for example, barely a generation ago» Thus, i t 
includes - to i^ention only a few str iking instances ~ a much 
higher proportion of specialized workers employ;ed in a modern 
and fair mere extensive and diversif ied urban sector, who are 
beginning co be found too in the more developed strata of 
comnierc3.al agriculxure. This different labour force also 
comprises the nevj entrepi-eneurs, who are more dynamic and 
innovating than their predecessors and are increasingly often 
found in nianufacturing J agriculture, mining, coristruction, 
basic services, coimerce and finai-.cial activit ies» It also 
inclxides r.ev7 professionals and technical cadz^ 'es whose 
influence i s p?."'ogressively more evident in public administration 
and tlie 'aanagemcnt of State enterprises« 
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It has been largely due to this multifacet transformation 
of the region's human resources that Latin /inierica was able 
sigTi.ificantly to raise i t s gr^ owth rate in the ctcade pr-ior to 
the srai't of the v;oi.''lJ recession and that, in spi'ce of the 
receaú'ion's nogat;ive effects and the growing protectionism of 
the industrial ized countries 9 the region continued to expand 
and di'/e'psify i t s exports and increase i'!:s ccir.petitive 
capacity on i:he V70rld mar'keTs. 
Rocognition of these positive facts shculd not, of course, 
maJ'.e us adopt a passi-7e and complaceivc attitude. On the 
contrary, i t shouj.d lead us to emphasize the pr ior i ty which 
ought to be assigned to raeasures for improving the sk i l l s 
ando esy.'eoialJ.y3 the versat i l i ty of the labour force, which 
are chaí-aoteristics that in a dyramic world sub jet to sharp 
changes, are perhaps the most essential conciitions that must be 
sat isf ied in order to achieve a rapid and persistent economic 
growth. 
(c) Capiral goods production potential 
Tliis qualitative transformation of the labour force has 
been accompanied by a continuous r ise in the investment 
coefficienl-» This grew slowly but steadily from 10% in 1950 
to 20?. in 1960 , to a l i t t l e less than 22% in 19 70, and much 
more rapidly thus far in the present decade, that is around 
26% in the last fevj yeai's. 
Two of the main results ox this investment process have 
been, f i r s t , the growth and diversi f icat ion of the manufacturing 
sector and, secondly, the equally considerable expansion and 
divers i f icat ion of the capital stock. Thanks to th is, Latin 
America's pi'^ esent capaci-cy to produce i t s own equipment, 
machinery and inp-j;i:s which are of basic importance for capital 
formation is much greater than in the past. 
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T?vul-.5 "or exemple i the steel indu'-try - 'ihich i.s generally 
taken as a syin.bol of that cspac.ity- and which undoubtedly 
constitutes a funda.nental ccir.pcnant of a reasonably sel f-
suff icient industr ial system - produced 2 3.5 mi l l ion tons of 
steel in 1978, which is 80% nore than in 1970 and five times 
the 196 0 output» 
In i ts turn, the production of cement - a product which 
rn-iy in son^ c degree be considered as an indicator of tne 
capacity to ii'ake a broad range of ii)frastructiiral investments 
~ was also 8 0% higher in 19 7 8 than in 1970, which indicates 
fnatj arj ha^ •5 been happening regularly since 19 50 , i t w i l l also 
double dL'r-.\rtg this decade. 
The increase in the generation of electr ic energy - another 
key factor of the capacity to support growth and the structural 
change .in the eoonoir.y - has been even greater. After 
increasing f ivefold between 3.950 and 1970 , i t has continued 
to expand at a very high rate so far in this decade, to the 
pc^ int where by 19 78 i t has airead}/- almost doubled the electr ic 
energy generated in 1970, 
Lrist'j.y. the jr.etal manufactures and machinery industry 
- which has decisive significance in the manufacture of 
machinery and equipment - expanded i t s production at an 
annual rate of about 10% between 1950 and 1970, and i t s growth 
was even more rapid in the f i r s t half of the present decade. 
As a resulTj i t s production in 1975 was 1,000% higher than in 
1950 (see table 6). 
For a better appreciation of the strategic significance of 
these figures i t is useful to compare them V7ith thoae for some 
of the :i.:o.dust-rial systems developed in some not too distant 
years. Thus, i f consideration is given to the group composed 
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Table 6 
LATIN AMERICA: EVOLUTIOKT or SOME KiACROECONOMIC VARIABLES 
AMD SELECTED INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS 
jr OS s--dome 31.1 c 
..roduct b/' 




(millions of tC'Vis) 
Cement 
(millions of tons) 
Metal manufactures 
and machinery c/ 
(1970=100; 
E lectr ica l energy 
(bi l l ions of y.Wh) 
Physical volume Annual growth rates 
-ÜUO -lo-o -ionn TG'T./ 1950- 1S8Ü- 1970- 195C-x9b0 19o0 19/0 19/8a/ 
M-8 . 9 80.5 137 ,1 212 .5 
9.3 17.3 33.6 57,9 
1.4 13,0 2 3.5 
7.3 16,5 32.1 57.7 
-.1 5,7 6.4 5. 
6,5 6.9 7.2 6.8 
13.3 10.6 6o8 10.9 
3. 6 6. 8 7. 6 7. 
15.0 41.0 100.0 173,Od/ 9.9 S.3 11.6 10.u 
27.0 67.6 147.6 271.7 9,6 8.1 8.4 8.8 
i/ Preliminary figures. 
B i l l ions of dollars at 1970 prices at factor cost, using the import 
exchange rate. Not including Cuba or the English-speaking Caribbeai 
countries, 
;_/ Excluding be sic m-etal industries. 
./ 1975. 
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of the Federal Republic of Germany, France and Italy in 1960, 
that i s , when these t h r e e Gconoiuiies, follnv/inf- th<?Ir recovery 
froxn n/ne ravages of war, had aliii.o&t ccnpleted a decade of rapid 
grovitli. and constituted one of the most rbnportant industr ial 
nuclei in the world, i t v; i l l be notred that Latin ¿jnerica's 
electr ic energy generation in 19 78 wc.s 15% greater than that 
achieved by tho?e three economies in 196 0, and that Latin 
America's cer^ ent production in 19 7 8 also exceeded the output 
of that groi-p of countries in 1860. Moi'eover, Latin Airierica's 
output of cement, electr ic eiiergy and &teel in 19 7 8 was 150, 
135 and 9% higher, respectively, than that achieved in 1960 by 
Japan y w]iich was already by rhat year another of the most 
importar.t and dynamn.c industr ia l systems in the vjorld. Final ly, 
the I'-egion's cement production in 1S78 x-jas about 30% higher 
than that of the Soviet Union in 1350, while i t s electr ic energy 
generation was only 7% less. 
It seems cliear, therefore, that thanks in particular to the 
development of the region's manufacturing sector in the past 
quarter of a century^ Latin America has toda^ / a re lat ively 
broad and diversif ied industr ial base which ensures at least 
one of the conditions for a more accelerated and autonomous 
process of capital formation o 
(^ ^ §ir:o of the m¿rrket 
It ir; a well-known fact. that the existence of broad and 
homogeneoui? markets constitutes a favourable condition for 
growth. They enable the economies of scale to be fu l l y 
ut i l ised, V7ith the resulting reduction in production costs, a 
fact V7nich is of decisive im.portance in the present-day scene 
and which has undoubtedly constituted the basic econcnic reason 
underlyinui t'he regional integration systems in various regions 
of the world. 
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TroTiL_t.hi.s-.standpainx, and i f the region is considered 
as a whole > Latin Amerlca-^ s—srttiaLxon.-^ n<i are 
also most inti^resting. Thus in 19 7 8 Latin America's tota l 
gross dcir.cstic product was equal to over 8Ci% of the combined 
product of the Federal Republic of Germany^  France and Italy 
in 3.960 ; i t was s l ight ly lower than tiie product obtained that 
year by the Soviet Union, and trebled Japan's tota l product in 
1960. 
Furthermore, i f from this year to 199 0 the region were to 
grow at an sverage annual rate of 7.4% - a i-^ ate which is only 
s l ight ly over that actually obtained in the period 1970-1974 -
Latin America's tota l product in 1990 would be 20% higher 
than ti-ia combined product of the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Franca and Italy in 19 70 and 10% higher than that of the Soviet 
Union fwi- that yeai", and 150 u higher than Japan's product in 
19 70 . 
It is true that these figures relate to Latin Amer'ica as 
a whole, vi'hich unfortunately is far from being a unified 
market today. However, they have a dual and far-reaching 
significance. 
On the one hand, they provide a f i r s t indication of the 
actual benefits obtainable in the medium terBi i f the countries 
of the region V7ere to progress decisively towards closer 
economic integration. In that case, the considerable size of 
the regional market would fac i l i ta te the instal lat ion in Latin 
America of plants which, for technological reasons, require a 
very high production volume so that the goods produced by them 
may compete on the domestic market with those imported from 
outside tiie area, given a reasonable and gradually decreasing 
degree of pi'otection. 
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On the other hand, the figures given on the size of the 
regioricil niarket also serve to evaluate the much greater 
ba-j gai.nirig power our countries would have on the international 
scene i f j inst"ead of acting independently, they adopted a 
joint o or at least a co-ordinated, stend, 
I'cquireinents fcr a rrov7fh. st^ r--..:ep:-y 
As we have seen, "the growth potential of Latin America 
is considerable5 for the region possesses abundant and varied 
natural resources, has a labour force with far better 
qualifications than before, has succeeded in establishing 
an industrial sector of some size, and taken together 
constÍTUtes a market of sizeable dimensions. 
This potential, however, does not of i t se l f guarantee 
that Latin America w i l l in the future actually arrive at a 
high and sustained rate of growth. To achieve this i t must 
conceive and apply a coherent set of policies which w i l l also 
enable i t to secure a fairer distr ibution of the f ru i ts of 
this grovrth and a greater degree of autonomy. 
It would naturally be impossible to sum up in the time 
I have at my disposal the essential characteristics of a 
development strategy which would pursue these objectives. 
Obviously', they viould also vary very much in the different 
countries of the region and would have to take into account 
the different po l i t i ca l situations of each of them. 
For these reasons I only v/ish to mention what, in my 
opinion, are the important requirements for progressing towards 
and achieving the above-mentioned objectives, I would, 
hOK'ever, stP'jss that they do not in any way constiture an 
exhcuG'iive list-, and I am also fu l ly aware chat they have 
very different relative importance in the different economies 
of the region. 
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Increcising domestic savings 
A firc-it condi'tion fov achieving x^apid, fa i r and 
autonomou.w'^  development is to increase domestic savings. 
Although in the recent past numerous Latin American countries 
have increased their savings coefficients 5 these w i l l have 
to he. much larger in the future in oxx-er simultaneously to 
boost the grovjth rate and reach a state o.f relat ively less 
dependence on external financing. 
It i s true that i t w i l l not be easy to comply with this 
requirements for as I already said, i f i t is real ly desired 
to progress in the f ields of the redistribution of income and 
the eradication of extrems poverty i t w i l l be neces sary to 
al3,ocate far more resources than in the past to the production 
of basic consumer goods and essential servnnp.R nuch as 
education and health. In order to enable domestic savings to 
be increased at the same time, i t w i l l be necessary to cut down 
the rate of grov?th of luxury consumptions improve the 
inst i tut ional machinery and incentives which promote private 
savings and increase public sector savings. This latter w i l l 
in turn require an increase in taxation, the elimination or 
at least the reduction of non-essential f i s ca l spending and 
the ef f ic ient management of State enterprises, 
^^T^e growth of exports 
A second basic requisite for achieving the pr-oposed 
objectives is to increase the growth rate of exports. It is 
particular].y important to f u l f i l this condition i f faster and 
ccntinuing economic growth is to be achieved in the relat ively 
smaller countries, for their exports account f©r a fa i r l y high 
percentage of f ina l demand and their export growth rate 
therefore has a greater direct impact on the gi'owth of 
production. Moreover, generally speaking the natural 
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reEources of the re lat ive ly small cour.tries are less wide-
rangixig snd diversif ied, while they also have a «'nailer and 
leas varied .industrial base than the larger Latin American 
economies. In view of these two circumstances» the poss ib i l i ty 
of speeding up growth depends heavily on their capacity to 
import a subctantial variety of raw materials, intermediate 
inputs 3 consumer £,OOGS and part icular ly Jiiachinery and 
equipment, and this capacity to import basically depends 
in the f ina i analysis on their volunie of experts. In these 
countries xhe export sector thus constitutes the act iv i ty 
which so to speak ••produoes" a large proportion ox the capital 
goodt; they need, and for this reason a continviing and rapid 
growth of experts is an indispensable condition for being able 
to transform plans for doB^estic savings into real investment. 
Althcagh i t i s less direct, the influence of the rate 
of growth of exports on the overall growth rate of tlie 
economy xs also very important in the largest and most 
developed econo.T.ies of the area. The import coefficients of 
these countries are generally ver:y low, and in the majority 
of cases the structure of imports includes only a sinall 
proportion o.f non-essential goods. Consequently except for 
relat ively brief periods - the growth rate of the economy 
tends to be limited by the rate at which the volume of imports 
increases', and this rate in turn depends on the speed at 
which exports increase. This last relationship may not, 
of course, occur in the short-term and even over longer 
periods i f the net income from loans and investment makes 
i t possible to finance imports vjhose value exceeds that of 
exports durin.g the period. This imbalance between external 
sales and parchdses, however, can cnly be maintained at the 
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cost of a growing external debt, whose adverse effect on 
the degree of autonomy of development is self-evident and 
the servicing costs of which eventually make i t essential 
to reverse the disequilibrium in external trade, so that 
f ina l l y the global rate of economic growth is once again 
conditioned by the rate of growth ef experts: hence the 
fundamental iraportance of rapid and continuous grovith of 
exports for these economies. 
^ ^ R^r'al deve3.opment and the F^ 'owrh of a cr icu l tura l 
prod^iction 
The modernization of the rural sector and the sustained 
growth of agricultu3:-^al production and productivity constitute 
a third basic component of a strategy aimed at rapid, fa i r 
and autonomous developm.ent „ 
In the f i r s t place^ rural development is indispensable 
in order to achieve a fairer distr ibution of social income, 
for in the majority of our countries the m.ost flagrant gap 
is not that between the incomes of the capita l ists and the 
workers in the modern urban sector, but that existing beween 
the levels of l i v ing of the urban workers and those who l ive 
and work in I'-ural areas. Not only is this inequalit\^ expressed 
in the different average incomes received by the inhabitants 
of urban and rural areas but i t i s reflected in a particularly 
clear and dramatic manner in the health, education and housing 
indicator's, and in the fact that the rural population 
includes an exti^ emely large proportion of the total number 
of families affected by extreme poverty. 
Tliis basic gap between urban and rural levels of l i v ing 
i s , of courses a product of numerous factors, some of which, 
l ike the very unequal distribution of agricultural property 
existing in many countries of the region, are structural 
features of the rural economy i t s e l f . To a large extent. 
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this :is also the result of the effects of economic pol icies 
which in practice have penalized the enterprises and workers 
of the agricultural sector. It i s a fact that in not a few 
cases exchange, t a r i f f and price policies have resulted in 
this sector receiving a r t i f i c i a l l y low prices for i t s 
products while i t has had to pay excessively high pi-ices 
for i t s inputs and for manufactures in general. I t i s also 
true that the agricultural sector, and part icularly the 
smallest farmerss have received a very small fraction of the 
total credit available. And las t ly , i t is also a fact that 
f i sca l exper\diture on education, health, housing, public 
works, training and technical assistance have benefited the 
inhabitants of the c i t ies to a disproportionate extent, to 
the relative disadvantage of the rural population. It is 
therefoi'e essential to rectify• these discriminatory pol icies 
i f the incomes of the rural population are to be improved 
and i f a fairer distr ibution of national income is to be 
generated. Measures of this kind, aimed at str ik ing a better 
balance between urban and rural levels of l i v ing , should be. 
supplemented by act iv i t ies which, l ike those aimed at changing 
the distribution of agriculxural property and rais ing the 
organizational levels of the rural workers, contribute to 
generating a fa i rer distr ibution of income within the 
agricultural sector i t s e l f . 
Tlie measures aimed at correcting examples of discrimination 
against the agricultural sector and the rural populations 
however, would not only be positive in that they would 
eontribu'ce to the establishment of a faix^er distr ibution of 
national incomes, but would also be of value in that they would 
help to inci'^ ease the pro f i tab i l i t y of investment in agriculture 
and augment the productivity of the rural labour force, thus alsf 
promotinf more rapid growth of agricultural production and 
consequently helping to achieve more rapid overal economic growt 
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This contribution would be particularly signif icant in 
the many countries of the region where the agricultural sector 
s t i l l generates the largest shar-e of the tota l domestic product 
and where i t s growth rate is in the f ina l analysis decisive in 
determin5.ng the speed at which the economy grows as a whole. 
In many of our econom.ies the agricultural sector also 
generates the greater part of tota l exports ^ and W'->. have 
already seen the fundamental influence that the growth of 
exports has on the overal l economic growth rate. Lastly, 
increasing agricultural pi?o duct ion is important because the 
rate at which the supply of food increases depends on i t to a 
large extent, and this in turn is one of the main conditioning 
factoz's both for the level of real wages and the stab i l i ty of 
price levels. 
Cd) Need to secure a minimim of s tab i l i ty in price levels 
F inal ly, I consider that another condition for rapid and 
above a l l continuing economic growth is to maintain at least a 
minimum of s tab i l i ty in price levels. Naturally, in the present 
circumstances, when the economies of the region have been obliged 
year after year to face up to strong external inflationary 
pressures, largely originating in the continuous rises in price 
levels in the industrial ized countries, this minimum stab i l i ty 
cannot be interpreted in absolute terms. 
In the l ight of Latin American experience, however, i t is 
also evident that inflationary processes of any intensity are 
essential ly incompatible with the maintenance of a high and 
sustained rate of economic growth. These inflationary 
processes may perhaps stimulate the apparatus of production 
during short periods and with apparent ease, but after a short 
time this spurt in growth i n i t i a l l y generated by inf lat ion 
tends to fade out, while the price increases•simultaneously 
reach unacceptable levels. The need to apply policies aimed 
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at easing inf lat ion then becomes unavoidable, and is evident 
from several instances of regional experience, the stabi l izat ion 
policies applied for this purpose tend to depress the rate of 
economic growth for several years and even cause considerable 
drops in the level of overall production and particularly in 
investment. Final ly, when the cycle comes f u l l c i rc le and 
inf lat ion is rcduced to more normal levels, the average rate of 
growth achieved during the period is seen to be very low and 
the accumulation of production capital mi:iimal, thus adversely 
affecting the possib i l i ty of large-scale growth in the future. 
Both at the stage of the acceleration in the rate of 
inf lat ion emd in the i n i t i a l phases of the stabi l izat ion 
programmes, real wages tend to decline notably, so that income 
distribution is also adversely affected. 
This is why we are convinced that the maintenance of a 
modicum of stab i l i ty in\ price levels constitutes another basic 
requisite of a strategy aimed at achieving rapid, sustained and 
fa i r economic growth. 
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C. The th-irã challen^-ç an'l roqulrsaent: strengtlianin^ 
"-ho autonc^ rr.y of .r.rcvjt.h 
The experience of recent years shov;s that Latin America 
has pursued a more open form of development, more closely linked 
with the international economy. 
This is notiiing new, as we are a l l awa.re<, The influence of 
external factors has in fact, been a h is tor ica l constant in the 
region and in the developing countries in general. What is new 
are the forms this phenomenon has acquired, which we shall now 
go on to discuss. 
To avoid misinterpretation .J let us say that we consider 
this evolution to be positive and necessary for the internal 
development process in so far as i t enables act iv i t ies requiring 
more wide-ranging markets to be projected outwards, and the 
way ultimately opened for another scheme of Lhe international 
division of labour. 
We must also recognize that not a l l the effects of this 
relationship with the international economy are positive, 
however. There are also risks to be identif ied and an attempt 
must be made to lessen them. These risks are manifested on 
the one hand, in the conditioning factors which this relationship 
implies for our development, and on the other in the undesirable 
fluctuations caused in our economies by the course of international 
events. 
Overcoming these two major l i a b i l i t i e s constitutes one of 
the essential tasks of econom.ic policy. This should foster 
the active insertion of our economies into the international 
economic scenario and at the same time reduce vulnerabil ity and 
peri ls involved in international interdependence. To the 
extent that these objectives are achieved, the autonomy of 
Latin American growth w i l l be correspondingly strengthened. 
How should we interpret "active" insertion in the 
international economy? I think we should understand i t as the 
kind of insertion which is fostered and selectively oriented by 
the national authorities in keeping with the objectives of 
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national development. This does not, of course, mean ignoring 
the role which the forces of the market can and should play 
this selection. VJe do not, however, believe that these forces 
should be the factors which exclusively determine the process. 
The linkage between the region and the international economy 
conditions domestic development right from the start. It 
must therefore be oriented so as to uphold the main objectives 
of the community. Consequently, the linkage with the international 
economy should not be entirely subject to the forces of the 
domestic market or those of the growing power of the transnational 
corporations. 
In other words, Latin America should make the maximum 
possible use of the advantages stemming from closer l inks with 
the rest of the world? but without renouncing a form of 
development defined in an autonomous manner. Just as each of 
our societies has some form of national development project, 
so also we should set ourselves a national project for our 
insertion in the international economy on a selective basis in 
keeping with our own interests. 
There is no single way of doing th is , of course. In the 
last analysis, the forms of insertion which each country selects 
w i l l be determined by the degree of development i t has achieved, 
i t s size and geographical location, i t s tradit ional tr=ide and 
financial relations and i t s own economic or po l i t i ca l ddeology 
as regards the development of i t s forces of production and i t s 
social objectives. 
The second basic objective in this area is to lessen 
external vulnerabil ity. In order to analyse the implications 
of this, It is essential f i r s t of a l l to examine the new forms 
of regional internationalization. 
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1. The new forms of Latin America's insertion into the 
international sphere 
I have already referred to the deep-seated change which 
Latin America has undergone during the last th i r ty years, and 
part icularly during the present decade. 
This change substantially altered the forms of the region's 
insertion into the international sphere in at least four basic 
aspects. 
The f i r s t of these changes occurred in the structure of 
Latin Ajnerican exports. In the 1950s, more than 95% of these 
exports consisted of primary commodities. Today, however, 
industr ia l goods account for nearly 20% of the region's tota l 
exports and are worth around 10 b i l l i on dollars, These figures 
clearly show that the Latin American countries have learned to 
export, by placing their manufactures - some of which have a 
high level of technological sophistication - in their tradit ional 
markets and di l igent ly seeking to open up others» The growth 
and diversi f icat ion of exports thus constitutes a novel and basic 
feature of the new Latin America. 
The second change relates to the origin of the external 
financing received by the region. During the 1950s. the bulk 
of the capital entering Latin Am.erica was of public origin and 
only a small proportion came from private sources. Nowadays, 
however 3 the percentages have been inverted. Four f i f ths of 
the capital inflow is of private origin and only one f i f t h of 
public origin. Owing to the abundant f inancial resources flowing 
into the region 3 the external debt increased from 10 b i l l i on 
dollars in 1965 to more than 60 b i l l i on dollars in 1975 and then 
continued to escalate unt i l i t reached an estimated 100 b i l l i on 
dollars in 197 8. Latin America has thus become an active seeker 
of capital in the private banking markets — a situation 
pract ical ly unknown in the past. 
The third change concerns the participation of the 
transnational corporations. The increasingly powerful presence 
of these corporations in the countries of the region is another 
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manifestation of the transnationalization of the Latin American 
economy. It i s estimated that in 1975 the accumulated investment 
of the OECD countries in Latin America came to nearly 40 b i l l i on 
dollars, while the overall sales by the transnational 
corporations in the region accounted for around 80 b i l l i on 
dollars - nearly twice the tota l value of Latin American exports 
for that year. 
The fourth change concerns the intensity and the nature of 
Latin American demand for technology. As a result of the 
diversif ication of the apparatus of production and the progress 
of industry 5 regional demand for new technologies has gone up 
enor^ mously and i t s nature has changed. This demand now covers 
the most varied f ields and in recent years has come to include 
nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. This trend has become 
progressively more pronounced as the bases of the system of 
production have been expanded and diversif ied and the region has 
begun to produce increasingly sophisticated industr ial goods. 
These facts show the prof i le of the new forms of Latin 
America's insertion in the world economy and reveal how i t s 
l inks with i t have become progressively stronger., with a l l the 
advantages but also a l l the contradictions which this involves. 
It i s therefore more than ever imperative to answer the 
question we asked earlier; how can we lessen the vulnerabil ity 
which the growing internationalization of the region creates 
in us? 
2. Lessening external vulnerabi l i ty; the tasks of the 
region 
Faced with this question, a clear dist inction must be drawn 
between what the region should be doing and what is incumbent on 
the international community - mainly the group of the 
industrial ized economies. 
As regards the f i r s t responsibi l i ty, we have already 
stressed that much of the action taken in recent years has 
worked towards strengthening Latin America's defence capacity 
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vis-à-vis the international economic conjuncture. This is why our 
countries must keep up the process of the diversif icat ion of 
production: increase and diversify their exports, both in terms 
of the number and variety of the goods exported and the markets 
on which they are sold: implement domestic pol icies of readjustment 
so as to be able to cope with the trends indicated by the 
international conjuncture in such important aspects as the price 
structure:^ and define policies for dealing with the transnational 
corporations so as to adapt them to national interests. Vie must 
also regard questions of regional co-operation and policies aimed 
at closer l inks with and concertation of our conduct vis-a-vis 
the international community as matters of interest fa l l ing within 
our competence, 
For many years CEPAL has stoutly maintained that regional 
co-operation should constitute a basic element of our development. 
We consider that vjhile this assertion continues to be as valid 
as ever, such co-operation should nov? play the additional role of 
serving to offset and defend against the vicissitudes of the 
international economic conjuncture. 
This does not m-ean, of course, that we should reduce our 
efforts to achiev-e an active insertion in the world economy. It 
does 3 however, mean recognizing that regional co-operation is 
nowadays called upon to play a more important role than in the 
past, in so far as Latin America makes an effort to achieve the 
double objective of reaping the benefits of i t s active integration 
into the world economic system on the one hand and maintaining 
the autonomy of i t s growth process on the other. 
There are, i t i s true, indications that regional integration 
is passing through a period of c r i s i s or stagnation. Of the four 
form.al integration schemes in existence ^ the Andean Group has stood 
out during the present decade on account of i t s greater dynamism, 
while the CACM and CARICOM continue to face major problems and 
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LAFTA is. approaching the end of the period of transit ion set by 
the Caracas Protocol without having achieved any rev i ta l izat ion 
of the integration process. 
Despite these circumstances^ the relations among the 
countries of the region have not ceased to grow during recent 
years J through the increase in reciprocal trade and joint 
act iv i t ies of specif ic types. 
Between 1960 and 1977, intraregional exports grew nearly 
three times more rapidly than exports to the rest of the world, 
so that their share in tota l exports increased from 8% in 1960 
to 17% in 1977, The importance acquired by regional trade i s 
even greater i f one looJcs at i t s structure in which manufactures 
carry a far greater weight than in exports to the rest of the 
world. 
Moreover3 the relat ive weakening of some of the formal 
integration schemes has been offset by a definite tendency towards 
the expansion of economic co-operation among the countries of the 
region as a result of part ia l act iv i t ies of a specif ic nature. 
Thus, the integration of the physical infrastructiire has 
experienced sustained and noteworthy progress both in the f i e l d 
of transport and in that of communications and energy (especially 
hydroelectric energy). The Latin American countries have also 
given considerable impetus to the complementation of their 
production sectors, not only through an increasing flow of 
intra-re^ional investment,, but also through transfers of 
technology from the countries which have reached relat ively 
advanced stages of development. 
In this regard., the growing heterogeneity existing among 
the Latin American countries from the standpoint of the size of 
their economies, their degree of development^ the natural 
resources they possess and other factors would appear to be a 
stimulus for undertaking joint action, in that i t makes i t 
necessary to combine the markets, natural resources, technological 
canacities and financial surnluses of the different countries. 
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Although i t would be premature to evaluate the impact of this 
type of act iv i ty on the economic development and. complementarity 
of the countries of the region, i t s dynamism, is certainly notable. 
\^ /hat is perhaps even more important is the fact that the 
increase in mutual trade has contributed very effectively to 
mitigating the impact of the profound disturbances which have 
affected the international economy in recent years= 
At the same time, greater economic complem.entarity among 
the Latin American countries vjould seem to be a necessary condition 
for them to reach new levels of efficiency and competitiveness in 
the world markets- particularly in act iv i t ies which5 for reasons 
of scale, the origin of their raw materials, technological 
sophistication or the volume of f inancial resources required, 
demand a joint effort by two or more countries. 
We are therefore convinced of the need to rethink the role 
which regional economic com.plementarity is called on to play in 
the future development of the countries of Latin America. This is 
also why we are watching with great interest and concern the 
progress which may be expected in some of the ongoing negotiations 
on the integration schemes, I refer part icular ly to those which 
should take place this year within LAFTA and the continuation of 
the negotiations taking place in the Central American Common Market. 
3. Reduction of external vulnerabil ity: areas in which the 
co-opercition of the international community is required 
It must be acknowledged., however., that the individual efforts 
of our countries and even their possible concerted action at the 
regional level w i l l not be enough to achieve a significant increase 
in the degree of autonomy of our domestic developments for this 
w i l l continue to be strongly influenced by what the industrial ized 
countries do or f a i l to do. This is why the Latin American 
countries have a v i t a l interest in the future evolution of the 
international economy and the process of negotiátion of the New 
International Economic Order. 
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I w i l l begin by repeating that the gipeat hopes of the region 
must continue to be firmly placed in this process of negotiation. 
When we look at the agonizing slownèss of the progress made in 
this matter so far, howeverj we cannot feel too optimistic. 
Moreover 9 i t is also true that the profound economic 
transformation of the region in the last few decades 5 and 
especially the new forms of our international relations 5 are 
changing the pr ior i t ies as regards the objectives which Latin 
America must pursue through the establishment of a New 
International Economic Order. 
Does this mean that our interest in this new Order should go 
down? 
The answer is most def initely nó. It i s only necessary to 
look at some of the great areas of international discussion to see 
that even though the relative emphasis may have changed, the region 
continues to be deeply interested in what goes on in the forums 
where the international dialogue is taking place. Let us look, 
for example i at some of the topics which are under discussion in 
various international forums today. 
^^^ A new international framework in the f ie ld of basic commodities 
A f i r s t example is that of basic commodities. As I already 
noted3 these continue to represent 80% of the tota l value of the 
region's exports. Traditionally, Latin America's main concern in 
this f i e ld has been regarding the proportion of the value of tota l 
sales which returns to our countries in the form of taxes on the 
profits of the big foreign commodity-exporting firms and the 
expansion of their investments. 
Now, however, the oiijnership of these enterprises has changed 
in many cases and the concern of the Latin American countries is 
centred more on the stabi l izat ion and improvement of prices and the 
increase in income from their exports of commodities.• This is quite 
logical, since commodities w i l l continue for many years to be a 
fundamental item in our foreign exchange income. This why i t is a 
matter of special and disquieting concern that in the last few 
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decades Latin America has been losing relat ive importance in the 
world food and commodity markets both to the other two developing 
regions and to the industrial ized countries. 
Thus 3 for example, between I960 and 1977 Latin America's 
share in world exports has dropped from U7% to 26% in the case 
of bauxite, from 70% to 52% in the case of coffee^ from 58% to 
46% in the case of sugar, and from 2 3% to 12% in the case of meat» 
It is easy to see the unfavourable repercussions of these 
figures for the majority of the countries of the region which 
s t i l l depend mainly on exports of these products. 
The loss of opportunities to increase our foreign exchange 
earnings impl ic i t in the above figures gives grounds for 
ref lect ion as to why the efforts made and the successes achieved 
by the Latin American countries in the f i e ld of exports of 
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exports of commodities. 
This is why the region must continue to take an active part 
in the discussions aimed at establishing a more equitable framework 
for commodity trade. It should be noted in this connexion, however, 
that the cr i ter ion of price stabi l izat ion is not enough, and may 
even be highly dangerous in periods of inf lat ion l ike the present. 
The important thing is to secure stabi l izat ion of commodity prices 
in such a way that they receive fa i r prices on international 
markets. 
It i s necessary to advance with equal determination in the 
f ie lds of the marketing., transport and local processing of these 
goods. The recent progress made regarding the Common Fund 
represents a positive albeit timid step towards what ought to be 
an authentic new order in this f ie ld , 
(b) External financing 
A second important aspect i s that connected with external 
financing, for in the future Latin America w i l l continue to need 
large flows of capital to supplement i t s domestic saving and i t s 
import capabil ity. Although, there have been times when i t may have 
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seemed that the improvement in the region's terms of trade had 
reduced the importance of external financing.^ the last few years 
have demonstrated how important the provision of external 
resources has been for the maintenance of Latin America's growth. 
There are also other important changes which should be 
taken into account in this connexion. During the years following 
the war, both Latin America and the industrial ized countries 
attached great•importance to o f f i c i a l development aid and 
especially the concessionary nature of the terms of credits. 
Today 5 our concern i s centred on three factors directly 
linked with the transfer of resources from the industr ia l countries 
to the developing countries., namely r 
(a) the progressive elimination of Latin América from the 
flows of transfers of public resources 3 both b i la tera l and 
multilateral." • 
(b) the real or potential l imitations on the region's access 
to capital markets and possible restr ict ions which might arise in 
the future• 
(c) the lack .of suitable machinery for facing up to the 
new-style balance-of-.payments crises. 
In one form or'another, and with different degrees of 
severity, the Latin American countries have been suffering from 
these problems, as they have made known in international forums. 
The progressive:elimination of Latin America from among 
the recipients of o f f i c i a l development assistance is very well 
known. Of course;, there is no question of denying that i t i s 
permissible and necessary for the international community to 
provide support to the re lat ive ly less developed countries of the 
third world in the form of generous credits on concessional terms. 
VJhat may, however, be disputed i s that this should have led to the 
exclusion of Latin America from access to public sources on the 
pretext that i t can ' manage on i t s own-' by making use of the 
private capital markets. 
- 64 -
We believe that Latin America should share in public flows 
both of capital and of technical •a&sista:nce - arid not only in the 
case of the re lat ively less developed countries ^ but also in the 
case of the remainders inasmuch as a certain type of credit 
required to finance the development of the region can only be 
secured through public channels, 
In this context,, I should l ike to emphasize that the region's 
external savings requirements are large today and w i l l be much 
larger in the future. and that private sources are not capable of 
meeting these needs on the terms and for the periods which are 
often required. Accordingly, i t i s essential that the international 
community should continue to support such inst itut ions as the 
Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank and the regional 
financing agencies, 
These observations lead me to the second issue of concern in 
this f ie ld: the need to maintain the region's access to private 
f inancial markets and to sustain the substantial flow of private 
capital currently being directed towards the region. Regrettably, 
these flows are largely flows of short-term and medium-term capital, 
and many Latin American countries have s t i l l not secured f u l l access 
to sources of long-term, finance, which is so necessary in order to 
maintain an adequate rate of growth. 
Final ly, some countries of the region are concerned at the 
lack of resources to deal with the new types of balance-of-payments 
c r i s i s . As was pointed out in the report referred to above 
prepared recently by the UNDP/UNCTAD Project on the balance-of-
payments adjustment process in the developing countries. 
'•it i s important to distinguish between those components of 
a balance-of-payments def ic i t for which a developing country 
is directly responsible and those which are due to factors 
outside i t s control ' . 
And i t is no less important to recognize that, as the report 
also indicates, 
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'•to the extent that such def ic i ts are merely the counterpart 
of structural surpluses in other parts of the system^ or 
ref lect substantial price movements of external origin the 
adjustment must take place over extended periods of time' .1/ 
Even though limited efforts have been made to meet these 
financing requirements generated by the international economic 
situation in recent years., much remains to be done. For that 
reason the existence of sources of resources provided on terms 
appropriate to the new c r i t i c a l balance-of-payments situations 
should constitute one of the principal objectives of the 
international community« 
It is therefore natural that the region is keenly interested 
in the international negotiating machinery through which attempts 
are being made to establish a new international monetary system 
and to assist the developing countries with their balance-of-
payments problems and external resource requirements o. 
(c) Relations with the transnational corporations 
The relations of the Latin American countries with the 
transnational corporations -. and the flows of investment and 
technology which are usually channelled through them - constitute 
another issue of major importance. For that reason the region is 
fu l ly committed to international negotiations.on this subject, 
and especially on the Code of Conduct= 
Latin America has become one of the most attractive regions 
of the world for the operations of the transnational corporations. 
as a result of a set of factors including the growing.size of i t s 
markets 5 the abundance, sk i l l s and relat ively low cost of i t s 
labour force j i t s degree of inst i tut ional .development and the 
abundance of i t s natural resources. 
This has sharply increased the bargaining power of the 
countries of the area. And as a result they have come to take a 
more active stance vis-a-vis the transnational corporations and 
have sought a better way to reconcile the corporations' act iv i t ies 
with their own national development objectives» 
1/ Op. c i t .5 p. 5. 
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This has led to the emergence of l inks and relations with 
such corporations which range from co-production and specialization 
agreements to agreements l imited to the provision of technological 
inputs or marketing services. At the same time regulations have 
been drawn up to ensure that the corporations establish l inks with 
local public or private capital, thus .achieving a fairer-
distr ibution of the benefits derived from their act iv i t ies . 
Nevertheless 5 concern remains regarding other problems, such 
as the role of the transnational corporations in generating 
balance-of-payments def ic i ts j their low level of investment from 
external sources,, the high import content of the goods they produce 
or the ways in which prices are established in transactions within 
the companies. 
A l l this naturally cal ls for appropriate decisions for 
national regulation. However, i t i s already well established that 
this i s not enough, and that to some extent there is an additional 
need for general rules., jo int ly adopted by the countries, to govern 
the act iv i t ies and pol ic ies of these firms, 
^^^ Co^ t^rol of the new protectionism in the industr ial centres 
VJhile painful progress is being achieved in this and other 
areas of international negotiations. certain actions are being 
taken in some industrial ized economies which, because of their 
magnitude, give r ise to serious concern in the countries of the 
region and throw a shadow over their domestic development efforts. 
I refer to the recent and marked recrudescence of 
protectionist tendencies in the major industr ia l countries. I have 
already mentioned that one of the most positive factors in Latin 
America's economic development has been the vigorous effort to 
export manufactures, Exports of industr ia l goods have thus become 
a factor for growth and s tab i l i ty for the countries of the region. 
Nevertheless 5 at times when this favourable trend is occurring, 
the protectionist tendency arise increasingly forceful ly in various 
industr ia l countries^ with a consequent adverse impact on our 
exports. 
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Thus an estimate based on CEPAL analyses of 75% of Latin 
America's trade with the United States,, Japan and the European 
Economic Community shows that, the protectionist measures applied 
in those three markets caused the region to lose 2,800 mi l l ion 
dollars in 19 76 in terms of goods not exported because of the 
measures. That sum was equivalent to about 15% of the tota l 
exports considered. 
It should not be said that we are facing a new problem. It 
i s well known that protectionism - especially in agriculture - has 
a long history in international trade, VJhat i s worrying is that 
this phenomenon is now assuming different characteristics, forming 
a much more subtle and complex picture, which is tending to create 
a permanent system behind a screen of exceptional, temporary 
measures. 
The introduction of quotas, voluntary agreements, non-tariff 
barriers and other protectionist measures is tending to increase. 
Their importance is undoubtedly much greater as a potential threat 
than as a present reality« But there are already signs which give 
grounds for concern and ref lect ion. 
The new protectionist measures contain blatant contradictions 
which have been pointed out repeatedly not only by spokesmen for 
the developing countries but also by o f f i c i a l s representing the 
developed world. 
F i r s t l y , there i s a flagrant contradiction between such 
actions and the tradit ional economic theory originated in the 
industrialized countries themselves, and also with economic policy 
recommendations made by them over a long period to the developing 
countries, to the effect that they should open up their economies 
to international competition and become more fu l ly integrated in 
the world economy„ This manifest contradiction is certainly a 
special source of frustration and resentment for the countries of 
the third world, and one whose consequences should not be 
underestimated. 
- 68 -
A second contradiction arises within the industrial countries 
themselves, and emerges in the difference between the costs they 
would incur in opening themselves up fu l ly to international 
competition,, and to that end restructuring their internal structures 
of production, and the cost of the new protectionism. 
In fact 5 the real costs of a policy of free trade are out of 
a l l proportion in the industrial ized countries to the protectionist 
measures they have proposed or adopted. 
For example„ a recent study carried out for the United 
Kingdom established that between 1970 and 1975 134,000 jobs were 
lost in 21+ industr ia l sectors as a result of increased imports of 
competing products: only 47,000 of the losses^ were attributable 
to imports from developing countries. This latter figure is 
equivalent to less than 2% of the labour force employed in the 
sectors covered in the report. But the net drop in jobs related 
to trade with the developing countries was even lower, since 
account must be taken of the r ise in employment due to the increase 
in Br i t ish exports to the developing countries. 
These and other similar data would appear to show that the 
impact on the industrial ized economies of competition from the 
developing countries is much less greater than is claimed in 
just i f i cat ion of the current growth in protectionism. 
Protectionist reactions to imports of manufactures from the 
developing world also usually forget that in their trade in 
manufactures with the developing countries in 1976 Europe and 
North America recorded a positive balance of 10 0 b i l l i on dollars 
- corresponding to the net creation of 10 mi l l ion jobs in those 
industrial ized economies taken as a group. 
Meanwhile, the recent World Development Report of the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development indicates 
that in 19 77 the developing countries absorbed 33% of North 
America's exports of manufactures., while Western Europe bought 
only 20%. Furthermore, the developing countries purchased 25% 
of the tota l exports of Western Europe, while North America took 
onlv 7%. 
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H. A basic requirement: the restructuring: of the 
central countries' economies 
The trade trends recorded in recent years have once again 
shown that the past international division of labour i s becoming 
obsolete. Only a genuine restructuring of the productive forces 
in the industr ial countries which would recognize this fact 
can lead to a healthy and sustained development of the world 
economy. 
In the last few years, the rea l i t ies of interdependence 
have been as notable for the industr ial countries as for the 
developing countries, which have long been acquainted with them. 
In this f i e ld 5 the conspicuous case of energy resources is 
certainly not the only one. 
As clearly pointed out by the Economic Commission for 
Europe, i t should not be overlooked that the proportion of the 
gross product which Western Europe as á whole obtains from 
external trade has grown from 10% to 20% in the past two decades. 
One out of every seven industr ia l workers in that region works 
for export. In the United States 5 one out of every three 
hectares of agricultural production serves international trade. 
Indeed, i t might be affirmed that at the present time the 
old saying could be inverted: everything that i s good for the 
developing vjorld i s also good for the industr ial world. 
On the basis of that principle i t would be re lat ive ly easy 
to infer that mutual interest- should be found in a genuine 
restructuring of the economy of the industr ial countries, from 
which would derive situations of prosperity that would be 
reflected in the economies of both the developing and the 
industrial countries. As Mr. Jánez Stanovnik, Executive 
Secretary of the Economic Commission for Europe, stated very 
clearly in February 1979, when he announced the results of a 
study by the secretariat of that Commission on the structural 
changes and trends in European industry in the past two decades: 
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"Growth and structural change are twins. Dynamic industr ia l 
sectors invariably are also the sectors which have been undergoing 
the most dynamic structural change. Or, i f you wish, the countries 
which have been the most f lex ib le in adapting their economic 
structures towards the sectors of high growth and high technological 
innovation have also been at the same time the countries of 
higher overall economic growth. One Lesson therefore comes very 
clearly from the past, namely that we cannot consider structural 
adaptation and change under the conditions of economic stagnation". 
Mr, Stanovnik went on to say that we find ourselves today in 
a completely anomalous situation in which the tota l resources that 
the governments of the industrial ized countries spend on subsidies 
are equivalent to the tota l value of their imports of manufactures 
from developing countries. Today they are spending about 2% of 
the g-nnsR riomp.RtTo. p-podunt on imports of manufactures from 
developing countries and approximately 2% on different types of 
subsidies. This seems an anomalous situation which is also closely 
linked with inf lat ionary trends. 
In the l ight of these facts i t i s perfectly clear that the 
solution does not l i e in closing trade but in a. genuine economic 
restructuring of the industr ia l countries which would involve 
recognition of the new international division of labour which i s 
a primary factor in the construction of a New International 
Economic Order. 
5. The strengthening of Latin America's bar;:aining 
capacity " _. 
Final ly, I wish to make some observations on what I believe 
is an urgent imperative: the improvement of the bargaining power 
and attitude of the developing world, in particular of Latin 
America. 
This bargaining power today faces new challenges and 
increasing dangers. 
- 71 -
The challenges derive from the new attitudes prevailing today 
on the international scenario which' are progressively tending to 
differentiate between the special situation of the so-called 
'•intermediate countries" - of which most of the countries of the 
region form part - from the rest of the developing countries. 
As a result, de facto situations are being created which, 
as I have already said, are reflected in the growing exclusion of 
Latin America from o f f i c i a l development assistance, in the tendency 
to discriminate between countries and groups of countries in trade 
matters 3 in attempts to reduce the resources assigned to Latin 
America by multi lateral financing institutions 5 in policies aimed 
at reducing the funds earmarked for mult i lateral and b i latera l 
technical assistance, and, las t ly , in the segregation of what 
have recently been called industrial ized countries from the rest 
of the Third World economies, as expressed in recent reports of 
national and international development agencies. 
A kind of abandonment of the region to i t s own forces is 
thus being created, precisely when the symptoms of recession and 
instab i l i ty are predominant in the world economy. What i s more., 
the slow progress in the negotiation of the new international 
economic order has prevented the adoption of concrete measures to 
deal with the specific and frequently urgent problems of the 
Latin American countries. 
The result of these policies and trends and what they might 
mean in the future has not yet been analysed in suff ic ient depth 
by our countries, save for their emphatic rejection in international 
negotiating forums of any attempt at exclusion or differentiation. 
We believe that the subject merits detailed consideration in order 
to deal with i t frankly in world discussions and take a stand 
against the risks which these differentiat ion pol icies involve. 
These risks arise both in the attitudes of the industrial ized 
countries and in those which might be generated within the 
developing countries themselves. 
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In the attitude of the industrial ized countries; in my opinion, 
two serious dangers exist. The f i r s t and perhaps the most serious 
danger i s that the intermediate countries are believed to have 
passed the stage in which they need international co-operation. 
The facts clearly show that this is not the case. Latin America 
needs and w i l l continue to need international co-operation for 
many years. Its heavy dependence on the international situation^ 
i t s increasing investment needs, i t s eagerness to incorporate 
technology5 to mention only a few significant items, are some 
reasons why the region must have the support of the international 
community to continue to play the dynamic role i t already has, 
which could be spectacularly expanded in international trade and 
investment. 
The second and equally obvious r isk deriving from these 
attitudes, whxcli i s accentuated as tlie international negotiations 
f a i l to advance at the desired rate, i s that of fa l l ing into the 
temptation of thinking that the problems of the New International 
Economic Order can be negotiated separately or sectorally, both 
by topics and by groups of interested countries. 
This would mean renouncing one of the essential principles 
of the New International Economic Order, that is., i t s universal 
and global character. In our opinion, the problems which this 
New Order i s intended to solve cannot be dealt with in watertight 
compartments. I f there is one fact which demonstrates the true 
situation in the last few years i t i s the close relationship 
between the f ie lds of trade, financing, investment and technology. 
Therefore, i t i s impossible to deal with one independently of 
another? hence, to break that unity of treatment would be equivalent 
in our view, to ceasing to deal with the integral essence of the 
situation and fa l l ing into piecemeal approaches which in the long 
run would not lead to the establishment of a fa i rer and more 
equitable order in international relations, but merely by postponing 
the real solution to the problems i t would sow the seeds of 
future controversy. 
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Similar r isks may be identif ied in the attitudes of the 
developing countries. 
The f i r s t i s that owing to the discouragement in the face 
of the slow progress being made in the international negotiations 
and the differences in level of development or relat ive positions 
vis-a-vis 'the international situation existing among the Third 
World'economies 3 the unity of the Third World might be weakened 
or even disrupted. 
This unity must be recognized as of fundamental importance. 
In fact 5 in a world with such unequal negotiating powers, the 
negotiating unity of the weakest i s essential. The developing 
countries, however large, count for very l i t t l e at the negotiating 
table i f they participate on their own. Furthermore, the developed 
countries should see in that negotiating unit the assurance of 
sound and continuing negotiations. 
This 5 of course, does not prevent recognition of the existence 
of special interests of certain countries or groups of countries 
in the discussion of the complex and wide-ranging problems of the 
New International Economic Order. But such special interests 
should be identif ied by the developing countries themselves and 
should be dealt with on the basis of principles of sol idar i ty which 
should prevail within the group, while at the same time claimed in 
the relations with the central economies. 
It i s therefore in the appropriate identi f icat ion of those 
diversit ies and in the search for mutual support for the interests 
of each country that the negotiating unity of the Third World 
should be found. 
The other equally evident r i sk is that some of the countries 
of the developing world might f a l l into a kind of "temptation of 
solitude" and choose to navigate the international situation on 
their own. We believe that such an attitude has evident 
disadvantages and that i t would be highly negative both for the 
construction of a new order and also for the permanent interests 
of such countries as were to succumb to that temptation. 
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A l l this leads us to the conclusion that i t i s necessary both 
to strengthen the bargaining power of the developing world. and to 
provide renewed impetus to the machinery for international dialogue. 
The mutual interest should be a rea l i s t i c source of inspiration, but 
the ethical imperative in the face of the existing inequalities 
should be the great challenge for the construction of a better 
world. 
Latin American unity i s essential for these purposes^ as 
much for the international dialogue as to progress within the 
frontiers of the region i t s e l f . This is the true meaning of 
col lect ive self-rel iance which, and with good reasons is being 
claimed in the developing world. 
For us a col lect ive self-rel iance is integration. We sincerely 
believe that the road to regional co-operation has scarcely started 
to be travelled. The results I have referred to in the f i e ld of 
formal and informal integration are thus, only the f i r s t steps. 
There are;, in fact j a great many opportunities for regional 
co-operation in the f ie lds of investment 5 trade 5 technology and 
financing. It w i l l depend on our ab i l i t y to see clearly where 
the common interest of each country l ies whether that powerful 
engine of our growth - regional co-operation - w i l l play an 
increasing role in our development strategies. 
A similar comment i s pertinent in examining the poss ib i l i t ies 
of co-operation between Latin America and the rest of the 
developing world. 
The i n i t i a l contacts we have made with Afr ica and Asia have 
caused us to view with renewed optimism the co-operation potential 
existing between those regions and Latin America. To take advantage 
of that potential undoubtedly requires firm and decisive po l i t i ca l 
support and also a basis of technical information.for the 
establishment of which CEPAL is prepared to lend i t s assistance 
to the governments of the region. 
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III . FINAL REFLECTIONS 
In closings and as a f ina l message from the secretariat 
on the occasion of the eighteenth session of the Commission, I 
should l i ke br ief ly to recapitulate the more salient points of 
this report and draw some conclusions based on what I have just 
said. 
In a l l areas of l i f e in the region, whether economic, social 
or po l i t i ca l , time has not passed in vain for anybody. The 
region's best asset is perhaps i t s fund of experience - both 
successful and unsuccessful - which has been the f ru i t of long 
years of travel l ing the d i f f i cu l t paths of development. 
Taking stock of that experience over the last three decades 
leads to three major conclusions: 
The f i r s t i s that during this period the Latin American 
economies have undergone a dynamic process of growth and 
transformation. Although varying in intensity in the different 
economies of the region, this process has brought about 
substantial changes in the great majority of them. As a result, 
the economies of Latin America are" today very different both in 
size and in other structural features from the economies of th i r ty 
years ago, when CEPAL began i t s act iv i t ies . 
The second is that in the majority of cases the. benefits 
of this significant economic growth have been distributed most 
unevenly among the different groups of society and consequently 
extreme poverty s t i l l affects vast sectors of the Latin American 
population. 
The third is that during this period the forms of Latin 
America's insertion in the world setting have changed greatly, 
which, as I pointed out ear l ier, has brought some favourable., 
consequences, and others less.favourable. 
Furthermore, i t i s important that i t should be clearly 
understood that the substantial changes in the po l i t i ca l and 
economic scenarios and in the workings of the international economy 
which set in at the beginning of the current decade and which 
- 76 -
reached a peak in mid-decade with the most profound and protracted 
c r i s i s the industrial ized market economies have known since the 
Great Depression, have radical ly altered the external factors 
conditioning our development. The world economic setting of the 
closing years of this decade is indeed qualitatively and 
substantially different from what existed at the beginning of the 
decade J and therefore to the foregoing conclusions we must add 
some further points which need to be better defined., 
The f i r s t of these is that the three processes mentioned 
ear l ier have taken on new features, almost a l l of which are 
unfavourable. The widespread ins tab i l i ty of the international 
economy and the sluggishness of the central economies have been 
reflected since 1975 in lower growth rates in most of the Latin 
American countries and a considerable r ise in their foreign debt. 
The simultaneous r ise in external inflationary pressures has also 
meant that at the same time the problems of income distribution 
have worsened in many of our countries. 
A second fundamental point which should be born in mind i s 
the transformations which have occurred in recent years and which 
continue to occur in the industrial ized market economies. The 
capacity of the central countries to respond to the substantial 
changes in the international monetary system, the structure of 
world trade and the supply of certain strategic raw materials 
has proved to be much more f lex ib le and effective than that of the 
peripheral countries, and has taken the form of the adoption of 
measures and the creation of machinery of a defensive nature. As 
a result of these responses - whose high degree of co-ordination 
has contrasted with the dispersed efforts of the countries of 
the Third World - the influence of the central countries in the 
bodies responsible for establishing the modalities and machinery 
which w i l l provide the framework for the workings of the new 
international economic order has remained very great. 
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A third major event of the present decade, and one of 
particular importance to the countries of the periphery, was the 
raising of the price of petroleum. This changed radical ly, and 
probably def in i t ively, one of the essential elements on which 
international trade and the development of the industrial ized 
economies had been based since the war. What is no less significant 
for the countries of the Third World i s that this was a clear 
demonstration of the advantages which they could gain by taking 
joint action to secure better earnings for their primary commodity 
exports. 
Nevertheless, as a result of the r ise in the price of 
petroleum and of other changes which occurred in the international 
economy as well as the development of the countries themselves, 
the latter have tended to d i f fer increasingly in the extent and 
forms of their insertion in the world economic system. The importance 
of this fact must not be neglected, since i t represents a possible 
d i f f i cu l ty for the renewal and strengthening of economic co-operation 
within Latin America at a time when the adverse circumstances 
deriving from the slow and unsteady growth of the central economies 
make joint action by the countries of the region more necessary 
than ever. 
It i s against this background of the economic and social 
development trends of Latin America over the long stretch of growth 
which came to an end in the middle of the present decade, and of 
the many deep changes which have occurred in the world economic 
picture in recent years, that I would ask you to consider the 
following three major concerns. 
1. How can the great majority of the Latin /unerican 
population catch up 
The f i r s t problem is to improve the distribution of the 
benefits of economic growth. This, as I mentioned before, i s a 
fundamental moral imperative of development policy. The continued 
existence of situations of extreme poverty and even indigence 
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affecting a large proportion of the Latin American 'opulation 
constitutes in my opinion the clearest and most unacceptable 
shortcoming of the style of development which has prevailed in 
the region. What i s equally important is that the erradication 
of extreme poverty is in most of the countries of the region today 
a feasible objective from an economic standpoint. Again, as I 
pointed out ear l ier , to achieve this objective sat isfactor i ly would 
ca l l for the application of systematic and coherent policies of 
redistribution accompanied by a high, steady economic growth rate, 
and thus the reduction of social inequality would go hand in hand 
with a considerable expansion of domestic markets. 
2 ^ .How to bring new ideas into- econcmic relations within 
^ t i n America'? 
ThxR fivpansion of the domestic market and the forese^;ble drop 
in the growth rates of the economies of the industrial ized countries 
highlight the need to introduce new ideas into a l l levels of 
economic relations within Latin America. In the present circumstances, 
these have tended to become defensive» in the face of the unfavourable 
trends stemming from the international economy, and constitute a 
potential on which faster, steadier growth of the Latin American 
economies could be based. 
It i s important to realize that this fostering of b i latera l , 
subregional and regional interrelations in Latin America should be 
viewed as a complement of, rather than a substitute for, the growth 
of national markets. 
Thus the second major concern which I ask you to consider, 
one with which CEPAL has been closely associated since i t s inception, 
i s that of finding the machinery and methods of attaining this 
objective. 
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â. How to tranj^fom passive insertion in the international 
economy into dynañic interdependence? 
In a world of increasing economic interdependence, i t would 
be unrealistic for a region whose performance has depended heavily 
upon trends in international trade and finance to set i t s sights 
on autarchy. Neither the expansion of domestic markets nor a 
greater degree of economic interrelation in Latin America should 
be seen as means of reducing their degree of insertion in the 
world economy. Quite the opposite. The export capacity of the 
countries of the region should increase and the vigorous process of 
growth and diversif icat ion of exports should be pursued. At the 
same time, the r is ing level of income of the Latin American 
population w i l l swell the volume of imports. 
The challenge l ies precisely in thinking out how the countries 
of the region can make maximum use of the opportunities offered by 
their position in world economic flows while minimizing their 
negative effects^ how to play an active role in the design of the 
rules of the game governing tirade and f inancial flows, instead of 
being relat ively passive participants 5 and how to reconcile the 
economic policy requirements needed to attain these objectives 
with those required to achieve the growth and redistribution targets: 
The dialogue on the New International Economic Order begun 
some years ago points in thi» direction, and we must continue to 
emphasize the set of topics i t comprises, and devote a l l our powers 
of imagination and negotiation to developing i t . 
I have ventured to single out only these three fundamental 
concerns. Neither their niomber nor the order in whi#h I have 
mentioned them' are the result of an intel lectual whim. On the 
contrary, they represent the secretariat's conviction that there 
is a deep interrelationship and interdependence between them. An 
expansion of natÍQ:3al markets which is not accompanied by community 
regional and subregional action and without a proper insertion in 
the world economy could result in a state of technologically-backwar 
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semi-autarchy. And an external insertion lacking these national 
and regional dimensions would represent an extremely vulnerable and 
dependent style of development. 
Final ly, I wish to pause for a moment to examine the 
implications for CEPAL of the identif icat ion of the three major 
concerns to which I have referred. The fact that I have limited 
myself to stating them and have not attempted to suggest ways of 
solving them is deliberate, since my main purpose is to e l i c i t 
guidelines from you for our future act iv i t ies . 
Naturally, the secretariat has some ideas in this respect, 
and these are contained in the documents which we have submitted 
for consideration at the session. We are, however, far from 
understanding a l l the consequences and implications of the topics 
which I have ventured to cover in this report. S t i l l less do 
we have a l l the answers about how the. region as a whole and each 
country in particular can face up to these challenges in the new 
and ever-changing conditions characteristic of the present world 
economic picture. 
This i s , in my opinion, one of CEPAL's principal tasks in. 
the immediate future: to re-examine our thinking on Latin American 
economic development and adapt i t to the context of a rapidly-chanrinr" 
world and of a growing variety of options within the region i t se l f . 
This is the challenge which the secretariat must tackle in the 
future, and whose dimensions and implications we hope to be able to 
begin to examine - at least roughly, at f i r s t - when working on a 
New International Development Strategy for the region. 
, We know what disappointment many of these exercises have 
caused in the past. But i t i s important to renew our interest, by 
updating the approaches to the preparation of a new strategy. 
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The opportunities opened up to us by the dialogue on the 
strategy are wide-ranging. On the one hand, we are encouraged 
to reflect on our own internal problems^ an exercise which of 
course constitutes a sovereign task for each country. But the 
dialogue can stimulate that ref lect ion and enrich i t with the 
cumulative experience of each and every one of our countries. 
On the other hand, the discussion of the strategy can 
expl ic i t ly include a constructive debate on the poss ib i l i t ies and 
limitations of regional co-operation. Thus, i t can be converted 
into support for the po l i t i ca l task which must be carried out in 
order that regional co-operation may be renewed and may thus 
accentuate i t s dynamic role in our development process. 
Lastly, the discussion of the strategy w i l l provide a further 
opportunity both to identify the problems of the new international 
economic order within the context of a broader perspective, and to 
establish specific goals for the international action of governments 
of the region. 
Understood in those terms, the international development 
strategy should not be, as i t was in the past, an exercise conceive;': 
only at the world level and from the centre of the United Nations 
system. This exercises which is undoubtedly valuable, should be 
supplemented by a regional view which, translating the global goals 
into regional objectives, w i l l stimulate dialogue and co-operation 
among us. 
CEPAL has always been intimately committed to this task. Toda 
we wish to renew this commitment, placing ourselves at the governmen 
disposal in this enterprise. 
It i s in this sp i r i t and conscious of the positive contributic 
which this discussion could have that I venture to suggest to you 
a l l that the Commission should procla.im as one of i t s great tasks 
for the future the preparation of the Strategy for the Third 
Development Decade for the region. 
Thank you very much. 
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